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INTRODUCTION
It is the way of symposia that, after conveners assign topics for dis-
cussion, participants interpret those topics to cover subjects that in-
terest themselves. I understand my assignment to be discussion of
"nonbankruptcy closure" and "settlement." The Judicial Conference
Working Group on Mass Torts suggests possible approaches that
might facilitate closure of mass tort claims by litigation or by settle-
ment! This paper will explore two models prepared to illustrate the
challenges that confront any approach to fair and efficient closure.
The first model is the "All-Encompassing Model,"2 while the second is
a draft of settlement-class provisions for Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 23.s Before exploring the models, however, I will consider many
of the doubts provoked by reflecting on the Working Group's experi-
ence. These are equal-opportunity doubts. There are powerful rea-
sons to doubt the virtues of individual litigation of individual claims
that arise out of a mass tort. These reasons support exploration of
mass aggregation and mass settlement. At the same time, there are
powerful reasons to doubt the virtues of mass aggregation and mass
settlement. These reasons support the argument for making only
modest changes or none at all.
In the end, there will be no firm conclusion. Indeed, not even the
doubts will be expressed in firm or fully developed terms. The issues
raised in this debate go to the core of adversary civil litigation. They
also test tort doctrine for nonintentional wrongs, the multifarious
t Thomas M. Cooley Professor of Law, The University of Michigan.
' The efforts of the Working Group are presented in ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL
RULEs AND THE WORKING GROUP ON MASS TORTS, REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION
(Feb. 15, 1999) [hereinafter REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION].
2 See id. app. F-7 (All-Encompassing Model).
s See i. app. F-5 (Settlement Classes).
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character of state tort law as applied to conduct and injuries that span
the nation, the role of federal courts in choosing and applying state
law, the practices of representation that have substituted for individu-
alized litigation, and more. Our received traditions in all of these ar-
eas are treasured, and properly so, but none of them fares well when
subjected to the test of mass tort litigation.
Only drastic remedies offer hope for effective change. Even those
who are prepared to accept drastic changes, however, may draw back
from predicting the benefits that would justify the costs. We may be
better advised to pursue small changes, anticipating only small bene-
fits. All that is offered here is support for the argument that the
changes that might achieve a coherent system are indeed drastic. In
some measure, these doubts carry over even to the modest goal of fa-
cilitating the hope for global peace through settlement by revising
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to address the problems that
thwarted two brave attempts to establish massive asbestos settlements.4
There is a particular reason for setting a high threshold ofjustifi-
cation for changes by statute or court rule. Both with and without re-
sort to Rule 23, state and federal courts, prodded by lawyers for plain-
tiffs and defendants, have proved remarkably inventive in addressing
the demands of mass torts. Stratagems accepted as routine today
would have been dismissed as unthinkable a scant decade ago. Al-
though founded in part on court rules and statutes, the evolution has
been very much a common-law process. It is often observed that each
new mass tort presents different problems, requiring different proce-
dural solutions than any of its predecessors. If that is so, it may be bet-
ter to leave judges free to adapt to the challenges without interference
from statutes and rules framed for the last war by Congress and the
rulemaking committees. There is a risk that lower courts, confronted
with overwhelming burdens, may act from expediency rather than
principle. Yet there is a hope that new principles will emerge from
their inventive adaptations.
One last prefatory caution is in order. In talking about mass torts,
it may seem desirable to offer a definition of the subject. One of the
two words, "tort," is easy. This discussion does not involve every con-
ceivable injury within a broad concept of tort law. We are talking
SeeOrtizv. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2323 (1999) (reject-
ing a class action certification as failing to satisfy the requirements of a Rule 23(b) lim-
ited-fund class action); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628 (1997) (re-
jecting class certification as failing to satisfy the predominance and adequacy of
representation requirements of Rule 23).
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about injuries at the center of traditional tort doctrine: personal in-
jury and substantial injury to physical property, real or personal. The
wrongs defined by modem regulatory legislation-antitrust, securities,
and the like-seem different. And even with personal injury, we are
seldom dealing with wrongs that are intentional in any but a very re-
fined sense. The second word, "mass," is not so easily defined. It is
possible to pick a numerical threshold, and that may be desirable for
reform legislation. The number is likely to be rather high. Two hun-
dred and fifty actions arising from common facts, or one thousand,
may be handled by the collective resources of state and federal courts
without significant disruption. But something more than the impact
on the judicial system must affect the choice of a number. It must also
take account of the impact on the tort claims. The broad model de-
scribed below would have drastic consequences indeed, affecting
choice of forum, choice of law, aggregated disposition, and more.
Large numbers should be required for this sort of approach. Even for
aggregated settlement, many models entail similar consequences in
gentler guise. The more drastic the consequences that flow from a
mass tort characterization, the greater the care needed in framing the
definition.
I. THE DOUBTS
A. IndividualAdjudication of Tort Claims
We ask a great deal of tort theory and judicial institutions in tort
litigation. When considering aggregating devices as mechanisms of
tort reform, it is important to ask whether, if we had judicial resources
for the task, it would be better to enable every plaintiff who wishes to
do so to sue independently and to sue as many times as there are de-
fendants to sue. Many arguments favor this result. The force of these
arguments is augmented by the weight of tradition.
Traditionally, the plaintiff begins by choosing a court. The rules
of subject-matter jurisdiction, coupled with the reality that most of the
central defendants in mass torts are corporations, often give a choice
between state and federal courts. Adept framing of the litigation can
lock the case into federal court. As between state courts, contempo-
rary views of personal jurisdiction and venue often give a substantial
range of choice as well. This choice can be exercised to tactical ad-
vantage by considering such matters as local aggregation practices
(including settlement), jury proclivities and the degree of judicial
control, choice-of-law rules, docket congestion, and attorney conven-
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ience. Often, putting aside constraining class action practices, the in-
dividual plaintiff chooses when to bring suit, whom to associate as co-
plaintiffs, and whom to make defendants. Individual plaintiffs also
can choose whether to push for prompt disposition and early relief,
whether to emphasize liability or damages, how to pursue discovery,
and-often above all-what terms to accept in settlement.
Apart from the effects of these many and elusive choices on out-
come, we celebrate the "process values" that go with individual con-
trol. The sense of participation and control are believed to affect the
level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with litigation and the acceptabil-
ity of the process. We tend to focus on plaintiffs in praising these val-
ues, perhaps in part because we-some of us, at any rate-do not care
as much about the process-value experience of corporate defendants,
and perhaps in part because we believe that defendants who face
many adversaries can achieve a substantial measure of participation
and control in aggregated litigation in ways that individual plaintiffs
can not.
Frank discussion of the charms of individual litigation adds values
that represent escape from the cold rationality of legal rules. As to
most issues in mass torts, the burden of persuasion will be stated as a
preponderance of the evidence. The preponderance of the evidence,
however, is an extraordinarily fluid standard that is shaped by many
subtle factors. The context of specific parties and injuries may have a
powerful impact on the willingness of eitherjudge or jury to accept a
given level of uncertainty. This flexible response to factual uncertain-
ties joins with equally flexible response to legal uncertainties. Fault,
contributory fault, causation, as well as the fancier frills that may
decorate tort theory, all bend to individual factors. Such adaptability
seems to some to speak ill of the institutions that administer our law,
but to many it represents a triumph ofjustice over law.
This summary recital of the advantages of individual litigation
would read to many observers as a recital of disadvantages. To take
one narrow illustration, defendants bewail the opportunities plaintiffs
often enjoy to select a court, while plaintiffs decry the occasional op-
portunities that defendants seize to defeat that initial choice. When
dealing with individualized events that involve no more than a few
people, nonetheless, these concerns have not led to any general
change or prospect of change.
Dissatisfaction with individual adversary litigation of tort claims
takes on a new tone when addressed to mass torts. With essentially
unique events, we have few ways to measure the correctness of judg-
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ments. It is relatively easy to take it on faith that most judgments are
wise. Mass torts, however, support frequent repetition of the litigation
experiment. Frequent repetition invites inconsistent results, both on
the merits and in measuring damages The inconsistencies, moreo-
ver, are confused by the efforts of both plaintiffs and defendants to
manipulate the results by jockeying to bring to trial the cases that
seem most favorable as measured by fact, sympathy, law, and tribunal.
The inconsistency and manipulability of results leads to regular de-
bates about "maturity." It is regularly suggested that a mass tort be-
comes mature only through a substantial number of individual trials.
When the results begin to converge, maturity is reached and values
are established. Until then, the fear is that a single adjudication can-
not reliably resolve all claims. The value of repose justifies acceptance
of the first fair trial of an individual claim, but not of many claims.
Quite a different challenge to individual litigation asks whether
individual plaintiffs always enjoy truly individual representation.
There are, to be sure, some attorneys and firms who limit their in-
volvement in mass tort litigation to representation of a small number
of clients, treating each case in much the same way as the same num-
ber of unrelated cases would be treated. Many plaintiffs, however,
come to be represented by a small number of specialized firms that
represent enormous "inventories" of clients. This broad-scale com-
mon representation is seen as another form of aggregation, and a
form that operates free of the procedural safeguards that surround
formal aggregation. Under this view, aggregation is a fact and indi-
vidualized representation for individualized litigation is largely a
myth. The only meaningful questions go to the forms of aggregation.
These doubts about the institutional and procedural capacities of
courts commingle with doubts about our abstract tort theories. In
part the doubt is whether our institutions and procedures are able to
5 An intriguing perspective on this variability is suggested by a footnote in the
Amchem opinion. In recounting the Third Circuit's opinion, the Supreme Court com-
mented on the wide variations in the factual circumstances and legal rules encoun-
tered by individual asbestos class members. The footnote records the objectors' asser-
tion that the statewide average recovery for mesothelioma victims in California is
$419,674, more than double the maximum specified in the settiement for any but "ex-
traordinary" mesothelioma claims. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 610 n.14. For class action
practice, the obvious question is whether distinctions must be drawn among class
members, either in settlement or adjudication, depending on their propensity and
ability to sue in high-verdict states. For purposes of reflecting on the consequences of
individual litigation, the observation is more datum than question-similarly situated
victims do indeed receive different levels of compensation in different courts, even
when there is no identifiable difference in defining the elements of compensation.
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administer our abstract tort theories, either in individualized torts or
in mass torts. The administration problems raised by mass torts, how-
ever, also raise substantive questions about the theories themselves.
Another doubt peculiar to mass torts is the frequently expressed
fear that "premature" aggregation will create a mass tort where more
sober procedures would show that none exists. One version of this
fear is that a few plaintiff victories in unusually sympathetic cases
brought in particularly favorable forums will stampede many claim-
ants into premature filings, intimidate courts into aggregation, and
force capitulation. A more sensible process of repeated trials of typi-
cal cases might reveal that there is no mass of victims.
Mass torts do not seem to have much effect on the substantive
doubts about the tort theories that define liability-creating conduct.
Negligence, product-liability, environmental contamination, and like
theories are challenged and defended on essentially the same
grounds. New point is given, however, to the rules that focus on vic-
tims. The point often is made in addressing the "predominance" re-
quirement for certifying a class under Rule 23(b) (3). Questions of
causation, plaintiff fault, and damages are treated as unique to each
plaintiff, and to predominate over common issues of the defendant's
responsibility. We are driven to ask, however, whether these distinc-
tions really should be made, at least when common injuries are in-
flicted on thousands, tens of thousands, or even greater numbers of
victims. Why, for example, should the "make whole" view of tort law
award more money to the victim who enjoyed the fortune of making
more money, and thus suffered the misfortune of losing a greater
stream of future income? How can we possibly presume to distinguish
the value of the anguish, pain, suffering, and like intangible injuries of
victims who have suffered the same physical impairment? Why should
we care that, statistically, smokers are more likely to be injured by as-
bestos exposure than nonsmokers? If we cannot trace the causal con-
nection with respect to a particular plaintiff, why take account of the
statistical probability-unless it is to support a contribution claim on
an aggregated basis by asbestos defendants against tobacco manufac-
turers? As measured by these traditional notions, it is indeed "weird"
that a settlement of blood-solids litigation should award $100,000 to
each victim without accounting for any of these distinctions;, a less
6 Chief Judge Posner observed of the settlement: "That all the members of the
class should receive the identical payment, even though the strength of their cases
(some of which appear to be barred by the statute of limitations) and the amount of
their damages must vary greatly, is downright weird." In re Factor VIII or IX Concen-
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tradition-bound view might see the result as profoundly wise.
Substantive doubts about tort doctrine bear on aggregation in an-
other way. Different state-law systems threaten to destroy the com-
monality that supports aggregation, whether by class action or other
device. If we become impatient with these obstacles, it is easier to
subordinate state-law differences to achieve the advantages of aggrega-
tion.
B. Aggregation
Aggregation has many advantages. It offers promise of "a single,
uniform, fair, and efficient resolution of all claims growing out of a set
of events so related as to be a 'mass tort.'v
7 At least after "maturity"
has been achieved, there is a single determination for all parties. The
single determination avoids the inconsistencies that arise from sepa-
rate adjudications, achieving the like treatment of like claims that
eludes us, at times as to liability and inevitably as to remedies, when we
cling to individual litigation. A once-for-all-who-remain adjudication
can command litigating resources and judicial attention in a way that
may enhance the prospect of fair disposition. Even if the result is no
more fair-if, indeed, even uniformity generates as much unfairness
as fairness-it may reduce drastically the costs that attend individual
litigation.
The costs of aggregation vary with the form. Voluntary small-scale
consolidation by permissivejoinder or similar procedural devices pre-
sents few problems. Aggregation by inventory was noted earlier. Ag-
gregation by consolidation of actual cases actually filed may seem the
next, more coercive step. The effect of consolidation, however, is lit-
tle different from class certification if any substantial number of ac-
tions are involved.
Opt-in class aggregation offers an alternative that has found little
support. The possible advantages are considerable. An opt-out class
imposes a burden on the unwilling; the burden includes responsibility
to read, understand in a sophisticated way, and respond to the oppor-
tunity to request exclusion. The level of informed consent repre-
sented by a failure to opt out is likely to be as high in body-injury mass
torts as anywhere, but still leaves much to be desired. A claimant who
has an attorney may not be given sound advice about the opt-out deci-
trate Blood Prods. Litig., 159 F.3d 1016, 1018 (7th Cir. 1998).
7 Ediward H. Cooper, The (Cloudy) Future of Class Actions, 40 ARIZ. L. REv. 923, 947
(1998).
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sion and many claimants-particularly those who have only "future"
claims-may not have attorneys at all.
An opt-in class, on the other hand, involves only those whose con-
sent is as real as the consent that personal injury victims give to much
of anything in the course of litigating their claims. The class can be
certified on terms that avoid many of the problems of an opt-out class,
including specification of a choice of law, methods for compensating
both class counsel and counsel for those who opt in, methods for re-
solving individual issues, and so on.8 An opt-in settlement class might
have particularly attractive advantages. The class would in effect in-
volve an offer to settle extended to all victims after negotiation by rep-
resentatives whose skills and result are likely to be respected. The
central objection to this procedure seems to be that it would not work.
Too few claimants would choose to opt into a litigation class, and too
few would choose to accept the offer of settlement by intervening.
The pragmatic view is that a settlement offer would be viewed as a new
floor, assuredly available to anyone who fails to opt in but supporting
more favorable terms for most. Even a litigation class would have the
same effect: No one would opt in, expecting that any class victory
would establish a similar floor for later settlements.
Broader and more coercive forms of aggregation entrench the
disadvantages that must be set against the potential advantages. Most
apparent are the loss of individual control and the risk that the effi-
ciently achieved and uniform result will be wrong. Defendants fre-
quently complain that there is no chance of winning on the merits-
even a defendant willing to risk the full damages liability that would
follow a fair adjudication of liability will settle for fear that the sheer
mass of self-identified victims will overwhelm reason and force a
finding of liability. The rewards of successful broad aggregation,
moreover, encourage a race to aggregate first, or at least to bring the
first aggregated action to judgment.
Class action aggregation emphasizes the problem of conflicting
interests among plaintiffs. The problem exists in any aggregation, but
is highlighted by Rule 23 requirements. A searching inquiry into po-
tential conflicts could easily lead to so many subclasses as to defeat any
" An opt-in class model was included in a comprehensive draft of a revised Rule 23
prepared for the Civil Rules Advisory Committee in 1996. See 1 WOREiNG PAPERS OF
THE ADvISOR, CoMMITA E ON CIvIL RuLEs ON PROPOSED AMENMENiTS TO CIvIL RULE
23, at 55, 57, 76-78 (May 1, 1997) (setting forth prerequisites for opt-in classes, and dis-
cussing, in the draft notes, the values of opt-in classes as well as their attractiveness to
litigants when compared opt-out classes).
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hope of either global settlement or a single trial. Conflicts will exist
based on differences in extent and character of injuries, optimal
choice of law, comparative responsibility, causation, and other easily
identifiable positions. Individual victims, given free choice, likely
would differ as well with respect to more elusive choices of litigation
tactics, most particularly settlement Workable control over a com-
prehensive consolidated proceeding is likely to be achieved only by
resolutely ignoring many of these conflicts. This result can be
achieved by pretending that the conflicts do not exist, by asserting the
advantages of efficiency and discounting the importance of the con-
flicts, or by forthrightly concluding that many distinctions drawn by
traditional tort rules for individualized litigation do not justify recog-
nition of an "interest" that defeats aggregation. With a choice-of-law
question, for example, it can be asserted that all relevant laws are es-
sentially the same, that the differences are too trivial to upset efficient
disposition, or that the differences do not justly warrant different
treatment-that like treatment should be accorded victims from all
states.
A very special problem of conflicting interests arises from the de-
sire to defer aggregation to the point at which a mass tort has matured
through the pretrial, trial, and settlement of an informative number
of individual actions. The lawyers best equipped to manage the later
aggregated litigation are those who brought the dispute to maturity.
They are the ones we want. The anticipation of aggregation, however,
may make it difficult to handle the individual actions without regard
to, and distortion by, the anticipated future proceedings. The steps
taken to settle individual-client asbestos claims in preparation for set-
tlement of a broad class claim provide a familiar example.9
Repeated aggregation of different mass torts creates risks of a dif-
ferent sort. Depending in part on the means of aggregation, mass
torts may come to be dominated by a small number of specialized and
well-financed lawyers, litigating before a small number of specialized
judges. The results may be similar to the problem of "regulatory cap-
ture." All participants know what to expect, and they expect to repeat
the strategies that have brought resolution in the past. Tactics may be
shaped by the expectation that all players will meet again in future
and different mass tort actions. Settlements in particular may reflect
9 See, e.g., Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2318 (noting the conflict of interest for attorneys who
represented both the plaintiffs involved in the litigation and members of a settlement
class of pending claims whose payment depended on the resolution of plaintiffs'
claims).
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received traditions and the expectation of future negotiations.
Finally, effective aggregation presents severe challenges to re-
ceived notions of federalism. The challenges are illustrated by the
features of the proposed "broad aggregation" model. Stated simply,
most courts are excluded from the action. Choice-of-law traditions
are ignored. Common appeal control is asserted even when the ag-
gregation court invokes the assistance of other courts. These chal-
lenges will seem daunting to some, but trivial to others. They are ex-
plored in annotating the model.
II. BROAD-SCALE AGGREGATION
Abstract discussion has its charms, but often lacks point for want
of focus. A model can help. The following draft is offered for discus-
sion, to concentrate attention on common elements. The draft is far
from polished. It incorporates, with only modest revisions, a model
that was prepared to stimulate discussions that, perhaps mercifully,
never emerged in the several conferences arranged by the Mass Torts
Working Group.' ° Although it was not deliberately shaped for shock
value, it may have that effect. It offers one view of the level of control
that will be required, in some form, if we are to develop a system that
permits a "single, uniform, efficient, and fair" adjudication of a mass
tort. Many observers will conclude that we cannot possibly accept the
sacrifice of traditional values embodied in this model. If they are
right, the stage will be set for reducing our aspirations. Rather than
seek "closure" on an all-disposing basis, we may face quite different
questions about the shape of possibly desirable changes or the need
for any formal changes in statutes or rules.
Here, then, are the statute and rule that together comprise the
model. This model involves both statute and rule because both legis-
lative and rulemaking processes seem appropriate to address different
aspects of the problem. Congress must control jurisdiction, as well as
many other aspects of the model. The process of the Rules Enabling
Act," however, is better adapted to the more purely procedural issues.
If a comprehensive approach is to be taken to mass torts issues, with-
out simply replacing present state tort law by a wholly new compensa-
tion system, some such coordination of legislation and rulesmaking
must be achieved.
10 The original model is set out in the REPORT ON MAss TORT LITIGATION, supra
note 1, app. F-7.
" 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2075, 2077 (1994).
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Broad-Aggregation Model: Sketch
Proposed 28 U.S.C. § 1335A Mass Tort Actions.
(a) Mass Tort Action. A mass tort action is an action filed by any per-
son against whom more than 100 persons have asserted claims
aggregating more than $10,000,000 for personal injury or death,
or physical property damage, arising out of a common course of
conduct by the person filing the action.
(b) Jurisdiction. A district court has original jurisdiction of a mass
tort action arising under this section when any two parties are citi-
zens of different states.
(c) Filing and Transfer.
(1) A mass tort action may be commenced by filing a complaint
with the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation established by
§ 1407 of this title.
(2) The panel must dismiss the action if it is not properly brought
as a mass tort action and may, in its discretion, dismiss the ac-
tion if transfer under paragraph (3) is not desirable.
(3) If the panel does not dismiss the action, the panel will transfer
the action to a district court or a state court selected by the
panel after considering:
(A) the capacity of the receiving court to administer the action;
(B) the convenience of parties and witnesses;
(0) the location of the events giving rise to the action;
(D) the sources of law likely to be chosen to govern the claims,
issues, and defenses of the parties; and
(E) the capacity of the receiving court to supervise proceedings
required to resolve issues that affect only individual claim-
ants.
(4) The panel may transfer to a state court only if the receiving
court is competent under its own law to adjudicate the action,
an appropriate state judicial authority agrees to accept the
transfer, and the court undertakes to exercise the powers and
adhere to the procedures established by this section.
(d) Parties. The complaint in a mass tort action must name as parties-
claimant all persons who have or may accrue claims arising out of
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the common course of conduct identified in the complaint, all
persons who may be liable to these claimants, and all persons who
may owe indemnification or contribution to those who are liable
to the claimants. The parties may be named as members of classes
or subclasses when they cannot be individually identified or are
too numerous to be named individually.
(e) Procedure. The Supreme Court of the United States has power to
prescribe rules governing the conduct of a mass tort action
brought under this section, following the procedures established
by § 2073 and § 2074 of this title.
(f) Stay, transfer, or dismissal of related actions.
(1) All actions in any state court or court of the United States that
relate to a mass tort action must be stayed when notice of a
complaint brought under subsection (c) is filed in that court.
If the complaint is transferred to a mass action court, these ac-
tions, and all later-filed actions that relate to the mass tort ac-
tion, must be transferred to the mass tort action court if trans-
fer is requested by a party or if transfer is ordered by the mass
tort action court or by the court where the action is filed.
(2) The mass tort action court may order the stay, transfer, or
dismissal of any action in any state court or court of the
United States that relates to the mass tort action.
(g) Individual proceedings. Issues that relate only to the specific cir-
cumstances of an individual claimant may be resolved by the mass
tort action court or may be transferred by the mass tort action
court to any court that is competent under its own law to entertain
the issues and that is agreed upon by the parties or chosen by the
mass tort action court.
(h) Additionaljudges. The Chief'Justice of the United States may des-
ignate and assign temporarily any United States circuit judge, dis-
trict judge, or judge of the Court of International Trade to per-
form judicial duties as ajudge of a district court where a mass tort
action is pending. A judge designated and assigned to the mass
tort action court acts under the supervision of the mass tort action
court, and may exercise the court's authority anywhere in the
United States.
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(i) Personal Jurisdiction. A mass tort action court has personaljuris-
diction over:
(1) all United States citizens;
(2) all persons in the United States; and
(3) to the extent consistent with the Constitution of the United
States and international law, all persons outside the United
States.
(j) Choice of Law. The mass tort action court must choose the law of
a single state or country to govern all tort issues not governed by
the laws of the United States. The court should choose the law
that most nearly reflects the substantive mode of the laws that
might reasonably be applied, having regard to:
(1) the location of the parties' conduct;
(2) the habitual residences and places of business or incorpora-
tion of the parties;
(3) the places where personal injury or physical property damage
occurred; and
(4) the extent to which the law of each affected state departs from
the general mode of the laws of each affected state.
(k) Limitations. A claim for relief arising out of the common course
of conduct involved in a mass tort action must be filed within four
years from the time the claim accrues.
(1) Bankruptcy. A bankruptcy proceeding in which the debtor is a
person against whom a claim for liability, indemnification, or con-
tribution is made in a mass tort action must be filed in the district
where the mass tort action is pending and must be consolidated
with the mass tort action. If the mass tort action is pending in a
state court, the action must be transferred to the district court for
consolidation with the bankruptcy proceeding.
(m) Appeals.
(1) An appeal from an order of the judicial panel on multidistrict
litigation dismissing or transferring a mass tort action may be
taken to the court of appeals for any circuit where the appel-
lant regularly transacts business or habitually resides by filing a
notice of appeal with the panel. Any subsequent appeal from
the same order must be taken to the court of appeals desig-
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nated by the first-filed notice of appeal.
(2) The court of appeals for the circuit where a mass tort action is
pending in a United States district court may grant permission
to appeal an interlocutory order when the court of appeals de-
termines that immediate appeal is likely to advance the or-
derly administration of the action.
(3) Sections 1291 and 1292 of this title apply to decisions and or-
ders of a District Court entertaining a mass tort action.
(4) A final determination by a United States District Court that a
party is liable to persons injured by the course of conduct giv-
ing rise to a mass tort action is a final determination appeal-
able under § 1291 of this title whether or not a determination
of damages is made with respect to any individual claimant.
Failure to appeal the determination within the time provided
by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure forfeits
any right to appellate review of the liability determination.
(5) If any part of a mass tort action is transferred by a district
court to another district court or a state court for final disposi-
tion, appeals from orders of the receiving court must be taken
to the court of appeals for the circuit of the mass tort action
court.
(6) Appealjurisdiction over orders and judgments of a state court
entertaining a mass tort action following transfer under sub-
section (c) is governed by state law. If the state court transfers
any part of the mass tort action to another court, the decision
of the receiving court must be entered as a judgment of the
transferring court and any appeal must be taken under the
law of the transferring state.
(n) Judgment.
(1) The judgment in a mass tort action binds all persons made
parties under subsection (d).
(2) Thejudgment in a mass tort action may be vacated on motion
made not less than five years and not more than ten years af-
ter the judgment became final by appeal or otherwise. The
judgment may be vacated only when newly available evidence
establishes the liability for a claim, indemnification, or con-
tribution of a person who was adjudged not liable for that
claim, indemnification, or contribution.
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(o) Attorney fees.
(1) The court must set fees for an attorney appointed to represent
persons suffering death, bodily injury, or physical property
damage arising from the course of events giving rise to a mass
tort action at a level that is reasonable in relation to the extent
and quality of the work performed and the financial risks
borne in the course of the representation. The fees may be
awarded from any amount recovered or, if no amount is re-
covered and the court so directs, from the represented per-
sons.
(2) The court may set fees to be paid by a client for individual
representation with respect to a claim that is compensated
under the judgment in a mass tort action.
Proposed Rule 23.3 Mass Tort Actions
.(a) Applicability. This rule applies to mass tort actions brought under
28 U.S.C. § 1335A. All matters not covered by this rule are gov-
erned by other provisions of these rules that are not inconsistent
with this rule.
(b) Claimants. A claimant is a person who has suffered, or who in the
future will suffer, death, personal injury, or physical property
damage alleged to grow out of the course of conduct giving rise to
a mass tort action.
(c) Claimant participation. An individual claimant may file a com-
plaint and participate as an individual party in a mass tort action,
but may not request exclusion. The court may regulate the par-
ticipation of an individual claimant by means calculated to serve
the uniform,just, and efficient disposition of all claims.
(d) Claimant representation.
(1) The court must certify as many claimant classes and subclasses
as are necessary to assure representation of all claimants who
do not appear individually by a class representative who does
not represent significantly conflicting interests. Claimants
whose claims have not yet accrued may not be included in a
class with claimants who have present claims. When a claim
accrues to a member of a future-claims class, that member be-
comes a member of the most appropriate present-claims class.
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(2) The court must assure that claimants designated as represen-
tatives are the most capable representatives available from the
represented class or subclass.
(3) The court must designate counsel for each class and subclass,
considering the preferences of the representatives, and taking
account of general experience, experience in litigating claims
growing out of the course of conduct giving rise to the action,
arrangements for fees and expenses, and ability to participate
effectively in managing the litigation. The time at which
counsel first sought to represent a class is not relevant to des-
ignation as class counsel.
(e) Notice.
(1) Notice of a mass tort action must clearly and concisely de-
scribe the course of conduct giving rise to the action, the na-
ture of the claims, defenses, and issues that may be involved in
the action, the initial categories of classes established to repre-
sent claimants, the right of a claimant to participate as a party,
and the stay and transfer provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1335A(f).
(2) The person that initiates a mass tort action must:
(A) file notice of the mass tort action in all pending actions
against that person that grow out of the course of conduct
giving rise to the mass tort action; and
(B) send notice of the mass tort action by ordinary mail [ (i) ] to
all persons (or appropriate representatives) known to have
suffered death, personal injury, or property damage grow-
ing out of the course of conduct giving rise to the mass tort
action[; and [(ii)] to all persons known to have been ex-
posed to that conduct if past exposure may give rise to fu-
ture death, personal injury, or property damage].
(3) The mass tort action court must direct notice to members of
each claimant class and subclass by the best means practicable,
including individual notice to each member that can be iden-
tified through reasonable effort. Notice also must be directed
to a central judicial authority in each state, and must be pub-
lished in suitable popular media at yearly intervals for the du-
ration of the action.
(4) The cost of notice under Rule 23.3(e) (2) must be borne by
the party that initiated the mass tort action. The cost of notice
under Rule 23.3(e) (3) may be allocated by the court among
the parties other than claimants or claimants' representatives.
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(f) Settlement
(1) A class or subclass representative may settle class or subclass
claims with the court's approval after notice of the proposed
settlement is given to class members in such manner as the
court reasonably directs and after a hearing.
(2) Any class or subclass member may object to a proposed set-
tlement. An objector must be afforded discovery reasonably
calculated to disclose the course of settlement negotiations
and the terms of any incidental agreements or understand-
ings. The court must award as costs the actual reasonable ex-
penses (including attorney fees) incurred to support a suc-
cessful objection, and may award the actual reasonable
expenses (including attorney fees) incurred to support an un-
successful objection.
(3) In reviewing a proposed settlement, the court should con-
sider, among other factors:
(A) the maturity of the underlying substantive issues, as meas-
ured by experience in adjudicating individual actions, the
development of scientific knowledge, and other facts that
bear on the ability to assess the probable outcome of a trial
on the merits of liability and individual damages;
(B) the extent of participation in the settlement negotiations
by class members or their unofficial representatives, a
judge, a magistrate judge, or a special master;
(C) the probable outcome of a trial on the merits of liability
and individual damages;
(D) the total resources available to the parties agreeing to pay
money under the settlement;
(E) the existence and probable outcome of claims by other
classes and subclasses;
(F) the comparison between the results achieved by the settle-
ment for individual class or subclass members and the re-
sults achieved-or likely to be achieved-for other claim-
ants;
(G) whether class or subclass members are accorded the right
to opt out of the settlement;
(H) whether any provisions for attorney fees are reasonable;
(I) whether the procedure for processing individual claims un-
der the settlement is fair and reasonable; and
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(J) the apparent intrinsic fairness of the settlement terms.
The issues posed by the model can be identified by simple annota-
don, following the order of the statute and rule.
A. The Model Statute
(a) Mass Tort Action. The definition of a mass tort may be too
broad. As drafted, it requires only that 100 claims have been asserted.
Claims do not automatically become actions. Even if the threshold
were set at 100 actions, 100 actions involving no more than
$10,000,000 would not be enough to unleash the heavy artillery em-
ployed here. The minimum stakes surely should be at least ten times
those figures. The problem of framing a statute, however, is to estab-
lish a trigger that allows for anticipation of filings yet to come. A rela-
tively low threshold is set in the expectation that litigants will invoke
the process only when the anticipated stakes far exceed the threshold,
in part because of the expectation that consolidation will be ordered
only in such circumstances. The discretion accorded the panel by
subsection (c) provides essential support for this low threshold.
The provision for filing by the mass tort defendant is a central as-
pect of this structure. As drafted, there is nothing that prevents class
actions filed by plaintiffs or other forms of aggregation from becom-
ing mass tort actions. It is the defendant's choice whether to invoke
this new one-court, mandatory aggregation system. Initiation by the
defendant reduces the prospect that a new aggregation scheme will
trigger yet another form of premature racing to file. It enhances the
prospect that aggregation will await maturity-it does not seem likely
that many defendants will want to bring massive aggregation down on
themselves without a compelling need demonstrated by large num-
bers of actions, pending and certainly impending. Nor does it seem
likely that a defendant will invoke this system until it seems apparent
that it will be defeated in a high proportion of these actions. Con-
cerns about enforcement by entrepreneurial plaintiffs' lawyers are
sharply reduced. The companion provision in Rule 23.3 for court ap-
13pointment of counsel further reduces these concerns.
This draft identifies a mass tort as claims "arising out of a common
course of conduct by the person filing the action." That is only a cur-
sory attempt to direct attention to the element of relatedness that es-
12 See discussion of premature aggregation, supra Part I.
"3 See Rule 23.3 (d) (3), supra Part I.
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tablishes one mass tort, not two or more mass torts or a diffuse conge-
ries of individual torts. There is an obvious similarity to such familiar
phrases as Civil Rule 15(c) (2)'s "conduct, transaction, or occur-
rence," 4 but it is better to avoid adoption of a specific phrase that has
a different purpose. Even if the Judicial Panel should come to adopt
some test such as the "logical relationship" test used under Civil Rule
13, there will be little harm so long as it is recognized that the driving
logic is the logic of aggregating mass tort litigation, not the logic of
compulsory counterclaims, crossclaims, or the like.
The mass tort definition does not include any element of disper-
sion. As drafted, it could reach a series of events, actors, and victims
confined entirely within a single state. Reliance is placed on the dis-
cretion and common sense of the Judicial Panel in making decisions
under subsection (c). Perhaps some express multistate element
should be added.
(b) Jurisdiction. Subject-matter jurisdiction is rested on "minimal"
diversity, requiring only that any two parties be citizens of different
states. Minimal diversity seems adequate to the basic task of establish-
ing an Article III foundation." It would be possible to rely instead on
the powers to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, to imple-
ment the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and conceivably the Four-
teenth Amendment. 6 These powers may be needed to justify later
provisions of the statute; this draft does not include a recital of the
findings about mass torts that would be relied upon to assert these
powers. The recital and express invocation of these powers would,
however, be useful, particularly to justify the several provisions that
depart from current Erie doctrine. (The Article III authorization of
diversity jurisdiction should be read to support legislation that author-
izes, for example, independent choice of law in diversity cases, but
there is no reason to fight unnecessary battles.)
(c) Filing and Transfer
(1) judicial Panel. Initial filing is set in the Judicial Panel on Mul-
tidistrict Litigation. There is no reason to empower a single district
judge to make the determinations required by this scheme, and there
,4 FED. R. CV. P. 15(c)(2).
"5 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 ("The judicial power shall extend... to Controver-
sies ... between citizens of different states. ... ").
"' See id. (extendingjudicial power to all cases arising under the laws of the United
States).
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are good reasons to prevent deliberate forum shopping. Those who
are nervous about filing an action with a "panel" could be placated by
renaming the Panel as the Court for Multidistrict Proceedings.
(2) DismissaL Dismissal is obviously called for if the action does
not qualify as a mass tort action. The discretionary power to dismiss is
important as part of the initial decision to set an artificially low objec-
tive threshold in subsection (a). It is more important as a protection
against overuse of broad-scale aggregation. Many alternative forms of
aggregation are available between the extremes that recognize only
individual actions and mandatoryjoinder of all present and future vic-
tims in a single proceeding. The Judicial Panel will enter this new re-
gime with a wealth of experience with large-scale pretrial consolida-
tions, 7 and will develop comparable experience that should support
far more discerning decisions than any statute could dictate.
(3) Transfer Although it seems safe to establish the Judicial Panel
as a specialized tribunal to make the consolidation decision, there
should be no attempt to make it a specialized mass torts court. The
limit of its authority should be selection of a good court. The author-
ity to transfer to a state court is noted in paragraph (4).
The five factors offered to guide the selection of a court are delib-
erately general. Only one demands comment. The location of the
events giving rise to the action is important for functional reasons-
the law of that place may be chosen, and the court where the events
giving rise to the action took place may be a convenient focal point for
gathering evidence. There is also symbolic value in trying a case close
to an important center of events.
(4) State Court. A state court may be best suited to control the ag-
gregated proceeding. There are far more state-court judges than fed-
eral judges. If it is desirable that the law of a particular state apply to
all issues, or to central issues, wise adjudication is advanced by courts
that can make authoritative pronouncements on that law. There is
little reason to suppose that only a federal court can provide the cos-
mopolitan sensitivity to competing interests required for fair disposi-
tion. It would be strong medicine, however, to attempt to draft a re-
luctant state court into this scheme, and still worse to attempt to
define state-court jurisdiction by federal statute. The conditions in
this paragraph are designed to ensure that a state court is drafted only
if it is competent under its own law, it has agreed to accept the trans-
1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (authorizing the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation to transfer cases to a single district for coordinated or consoli-
dated pretrial proceedings).
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fer, and it has agreed to adhere to the federal procedure.
The full scheme creates one special difficulty that may arise from
an initial transfer to a state court. Subsection (g) authorizes transfer
of individual claims to other courts. This power may be indispensable;
there may be no individual court that has the resources to try all indi-
vidual aspects of a mass tort, and there is little reason to attempt to
funnel sufficient resources to any single court. Individual trials,
moreover, may be much better held in courts convenient to the indi-
vidual claimants. Subsection (m), however, seeks to establish uniform
appellate review even after transfer of individual claims. Transfer of
individual claims by a state court may lead to proceedings in state and
federal courts in many places. The solution offered in subsection (m)
is to bring all appeals back to the state of the mass tort action court,
addressing the conceptual problems by directing that decisions of the
other courts be entered as judgments of the mass tort action court.
This system may be too complicated to be worth the effort. If so, it
may be better to delete state courts from the new structure. Still, it
seems worth substantial effort to keep them in the statute as potential
consolidation courts.
(d) Parties. The mandatoryjoinder provision of subsection (d) is
nearly as broad as can be imagined. That is the nature of closure.
Full closure can be achieved only by gathering all victims, actual and
potential; all "defendants"; and all potential indemnitors and con-
tributors. In addition, full consistency can be achieved only if all of
these interrelated claims and demands are resolved by the same tri-
bunal-and even then, full consistency may be difficult to achieve.
This is one of the points of particular distress. One court is given
authority, out to the expansive personaljurisdiction limits of subsec-
tion (i), over everyone. The patient in Maine, and the doctor who
prescribed the diet drug in Maine, may be sucked into litigation in
California involving tens of thousands of other parties and massive
confusion. The model, in addition, would frequently lead to adjust-
ment of legal relations between these Maine parties by the law of some
other state. As drafted, the model would even include as parties the
pharmacy and doctor who might in the future be held liable to a
plaintiff who has not yet recognized a latent injury. But holding any
party out from the consolidation will defeat closure. If the Maine pa-
tient is left free to pursue the Maine doctor in Maine, the doctor
should not be denied the right to pursue contribution or indemnifica-
tion from the drug manufacturer. Multiplied by all of the claimants,
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potential defendants, and combinations of indemnification and con-
tribution relationships, exceptions would break the system down ir-
reparably. The burden imposed on the individual defendants,
moreover, need not be great. The mass tort action court will inevita-
bly remit the individual issues to another court, commonly a court at
the location of the individual plaintiff or defendant. Joinder in the
mass action is intended primarily to serve two purposes. Joinder en-
ables the mass tort action court to establish an orderly progress from
disposition of the common issues to disposition of the individual is-
sues. Joinder also serves as a substitute for an expanded concept of
"privity"-such as "virtual representation"18-- to justify binding all par-
ties by the common adjudication of common issues. There is very lit-
tle real difference between nonparty preclusion and this form ofjoin-
der as parties of countless people who cannot effectively participate,
but the theory is easier to explain in traditional terms.
The provision for naming parties as classes or subclasses makes no
provision for requesting exclusion, and none is provided in the com-
panion Rule 23.3. This provision is not limited to classes of claimants.
Classes of intermediaries seeking indemnification or contribution,
such as the retailers who are sued for selling a defective product, are
also contemplated. It also may prove possible to identify defendant
classes. A defendant class might make excellent sense, for example, in
a "market-share" liability setting in which many manufacturers made a
defective product and it is difficult to identify which defendant made
the product that actually injured each victim.
(e) Procedure. This specialized Rules Enabling Act is deliberately
drafted to adopt the procedures of the original Enabling Act, but to
establish an independent rulemaking authority. A court rule govern-
ing mass tort proceedings under this statute is not limited by the full
sweep of the 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) restriction that a rule of procedure
"shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." The at-
tempt to integrate the statute with court rulemaking requires this
added degree of flexibility.
1 8 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, 18 FEDERAL
PRAcrIcE AND PROCEDURE § 4457 (2d ed. 1992 & Supp. 2000) [hereinafter WRIGHT,
MILLER & COOPER] (defining virtual representation as "a theory of nonparty preclu-
sion" which "would preclude relitigation of any issue that had once been adequately
tried by a person sharing a substantial identity of interests with a nonparty").
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(f) Stay orDismissal of Related Actions.
(1) Consolidation. Consolidation is authorized only when numer-
ous individual actions have already been filed. It would be possible to
draft an automatic stay that nullifies any action taken in any inde-
pendent proceeding after the mass tort proceeding is filed, but such
drastic measures do not seem necessary. Little harm will be done if
one or more individual actions are brought to a close during the early
stages of the consolidation. The defendant that initiates the consoli-
dation has power under the draft to win a stay of any individual action
by filing a notice in the court where the action is pending. Other par-
ties will have the same power, somewhat deferred by the need to have
notice of the mass tort action.
Consolidation of an individual action into the mass tort proceed-
ing can be accomplished by request of any party, by order of the court
where the action is pending, or by order of the mass tort action court.
The test for stay and consolidation is deliberately flexible. It re-
quires only that the action "relate to a mass tort action." This term is
broad, but it seems no broader than the mandatory partyjoinder pro-
visions of subsection (d). All the independent actions are likely to in-
volve parties and claims that must be made in the mass tort action.
(2) Other Actions Stayed or Dismissed. Paragraph (2) confirms the
power of the mass tort action court to transfer any related proceeding
to itself. It adds the useful power to stay any related action in another
court, or to order that the action be dismissed. As drafted, this power
literally authorizes the mass tort court to direct dismissal of an action
in another state or federal court. If that direct assertion of authority is
too much to bear, it might be better to adopt the slightly more defer-
ential-but redundant-procedure of directing transfer to the mass
tort action court, to be followed by the mass tort action court's order
of dismissal.
(g) Individual Proceedings. Centralized determination of common
issues need not entail disposition of all individual issues. The pro-
posed system is made much more workable by providing that individ-
ual issues can be adjudicated by the mass tort action court or trans-
ferred to other courts. In a nationwide mass tort, transfer back to
courts in every state is probable. In the alternative, it is possible, al-
though obviously awkward, that transfers will be made to most state
courts but not to those that seem particularly suspect to the mass tort
action court. A pattern of particularly high or low damages awards in
the actions brought to judgment before consolidation is one likely
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ground for suspicion.
The advantages of farming out individualized issues cannot be
won without risk. One risk is conceptual. Comparative responsibility
provides a clear illustration. The determination that a product is de-
fective does not establish any useful basis for comparing the manufac-
turer's responsibility with the responsibility of any particular person
injured by the product. Full trial of the comparison requires full re-
trial of responsibility on all sides; it is confusing and stultifying to di-
rect that in the individual proceeding some level of manufacturer re-
sponsibility be found even though the evidence seems to indicate
there was no manufacturer responsibility at all. This risk might be re-
duced by retaining decision of the individualized issues in the mass
tort action court, although this would require an elaborate adminis-
trative system.
Another risk is more practical. The courts that receive the indi-
vidual actions may not be persuaded by the rulings of the mass tort ac-
tion court. The appeal provisions of subsection (m) are an attempt to
avoid subversion of the mass tort action court's determinations of
common issues in the guise of resolving individualized issues. Even if
the structure can be built, however, recalcitrant trial courts may find
ready ways to defeat effective appellate review.
(h) Additional Judges. This provision expands the judicial power
of a federal mass tort action court. Other Article III judges may be
appointed to the court without limit, and may exercise their powers as
judges of the court without even leaving their home bases. There may
be some awkwardness in authorizing a single district judge to "super-
vise" a large number of otherjudges, some of whom occupy hierarchi-
cally superior positions. The benefits of this scheme, however, seem
to justify the potential difficulties. Appointment of additional judges
to the mass tort action court may prove an effective alternative to the
formal transfer of individualized determinations-proceedings are
held in a location convenient to the individual victim, but centralized
authority is maintained.
This provision assumes that a state-court judge cannot be as-
signed, even temporarily, to be ajudge in a federal court. For similar
reasons, it forgoes any attempt to assign federal judges to state courts,
or to assign a judge of one state to a court in another state. It might
be possible to overcome the manifold constitutional objections to less
timid schemes, but the possibility seems too slender to pursue.
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(i) PersonalJurisdiction. Full closure dictates personal jurisdiction
to the limits of constitutional authority. It is not particularly adven-
turesome to assume that a United States District Court can assert per-
sonal jurisdiction over all United States citizens, wherever they may
be, and over all persons in the United States. The provision for other
persons outside the United States is a familiar long-arm statute strat-
egy- the statute invokes the limits of constitutional and international
law.
19
It may seem more adventuresome to provide similar state-court
authority by federal statute. It is a federal tribunal that selects the
state court, however, and this added protection should suffice to en-
sure that a state court can do whatever might be done by a federal
court sitting in the same state.
() Choice of Law. The assumption of this provision is that a single
law should govern all the tort issues arising from a mass tort that has
spread so wide as to come into this system. That assumption is debat-
able, but the terms of the debate need not be elaborated here. It is
enough to suggest that current choice-of-law theories do not support
any argument that there is a single "correct" answer to the choice of
law for each individual dispute within the mass tort, and that this cor-
rect choice vests a "right" that cannot be undone by a contrary choice.
The choice process is much too open-ended, uncertain, and forum-
dependent.
The wish for a single law does not dictate that the single law be
that of a single state or country. The statute could establish federal
substantive rules, although the difficulty of reaching all of the issues
that might arise in a mass tort would be formidable. The statute could
authorize federal courts to develop judge-made tort law for this pur-
pose, and direct that a state court receiving a mass tort action from
the Judicial Panel do its best to follow this federal common law. Al-
ternatively, the statute could direct the courts to develop a "consen-
sus" view of the laws of the several states that might be chosen if a con-
ventional choice of law were made, although that approach could
easily generate a combination of doctrines for different issues that no
court would embrace as its own. There is no compelling ground to
choose one alternative over another. Reliance on the entire law of a
single real jurisdiction, however, does provide an external constraint
that reduces the danger of an arbitrary set of rules developed for the
'9 Compare this provision with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k) (2).
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ad hoc purposes of a specific case.
The central direction guiding the choice of law is to pick "the law
that most nearly reflects the substantive mode of the laws that might
reasonably be applied."2' This direction is not as novel as it might
seem. The purpose is to decide a set of tort claims, taking account of
contemporary perceptions of tort policy. The modal view of state
courts provides greater assurance than any loftier theory of the pur-
poses of tort law. In addition, this approach reduces the seeming un-
fairness that might be found in choosing the eccentric law of one state
to govern the many claims that may have tenuous connections to that
state. Four paragraphs enumerate relationships to be considered.
These criteria are completely unremarkable, unless it is remarkable to
omit any reference to the places of the relationships among the par-
ties.
The choice-of-law provision is restricted to tort issues. This term is
intended to include invocations of warranty theory to mimic product-
liability doctrine. It also is intended to include ordinary tort claims
for contribution or indemnification, despite the contractual incidents
of such claims. It is intended to exclude disputes about liability insur-
ance coverage. Although it is tempting to designate the law that gov-
erns the tort claims to cover insurance disputes as well, that step may
do too much violence to the prospect that insurance relationships
may involve actual reliance on an expected choice of law.
(k) Limitation. The limitations provision is a place-keeper, de-
signed only to identify the question whether a uniform federal limita-
tions law should be substituted for the untidy array of state laws. Sim-
ply providing a four-year period from the time a claim "accrues" does
not accomplish much. It does establish federal authority to determine
when a claim accrues and to establish uniform rules for the doctrines
that surround any limitations statute.
Several additional provisions will be desirable. One would address
directly the questions raised by future claimants, both those who have
been exposed to the circumstances that may cause injury first detect-
able in the future and also those who have not yet been exposed. The
appropriate system might well provide for registration, allowing a per-
son who has been exposed to avoid any future limitations problem
without the need to file an action to ensure tolling. The approach to
future claimants might be integrated with the partyjoinder provisions
Proposed 28 U.S.C. § 1335AU), supra Part II.
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in subsection (d), which require joinder of every person who "may ac-
crue" a claim. Another provision might wrestle with the problems
presented by claims that arose and perhaps expired before the mass
tort action was filed: should the federal law, triggered by initiation of
the mass tort action, reach back to revive claims barred by state law? It
may be important to deal with limitations issues, but it is not clear
what provisions should be made.
() Bankruptcy. The purpose of the bankruptcy provision is simple
enough. The liability associated with a mass tort may be associated
with the bankruptcy of the tortfeasor or the bankruptcy of a person
with a contribution or indemnification obligation to the tortfeasor.
The tort liability may be a primary cause of the bankruptcy filing, but
it need not be. Whatever the role of the tort liability, it is important to
establish common control of the mass tort litigation and the bank-
ruptcy proceedings. When this formal mass tort action procedure has
been invoked, it seems best to establish common control in the mass
tort action court. Control need not mean everlasting consolidation; it
means only that the court can determine the most appropriate course
of action free from competition between the tort and bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. The provision that the debtor must file for bankruptcy in
the district where the mass tort action is pending defeats the venue
choices the debtor might otherwise have, but that seems better than
the alternative of assigning the mass tort action court to the district
that the debtor chooses for the bankruptcy proceedings. Giving free
rein to the debtor's choice of venue before a mass tort action is as-
signed by the Judicial Panel to a mass tort action court, however,
makes sense. The statute might be expanded to provide for assign-
ment of the judge responsible for the mass tort action to the district
chosen by the debtor for the bankruptcy proceeding, and to provide
that this judge will be assigned to the bankruptcy proceeding.
(m) Appeals. Designating the court to hear appeals in mass tort
action proceedings is no easy task. It is a fair question whether there
should be any opportunity to review an order of the Judicial Panel
with respect to initiation of a mass tort action. This draft provides for
appeal from an order dismissing or transferring a mass tort action.
There is no obvious circuit to choose for such appeals; the draft
adopts a common model by allowing the first appellant to choose any
circuit where the appellant regularly transacts business or habitually
resides. Later appeals go to that circuit. There is no provision for re-
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solving apparent dead heats; perhaps the procedures of 28 U.S.C.
21§ 2112 for administrative review should be adapted for this purpose.
It might also be desirable to deny any right to appeal dismissal of a
mass tort action by theJudicial Panel. Whether based on discretion or
misinterpretation of the statute, refusal to invoke this extraordinary
procedure simply leaves matters where they lie under present rules.
Rather than prolong proceedings and the resulting uncertainty, the
Judicial Panel might well be given the final word. The same argument
might be made against any review of an order that establishes a mass
tort action, but the consequences seem so grave as to warrant a right
to appeal.
Once a mass tort action is assigned to a United States District
Court, the ordinary rules of appeal jurisdiction seem adequate to most
needs. Paragraph two provides the court of appeals with discretion to
permit an interlocutory appeal without certification by the district
court, going beyond 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) in much the same way as new
Rule 23(f) does for orders granting or denying class certification.
This provision should reduce, and indeed displace, any need for ex-
traordinary writ practice.
Special provision is made for appeal from a decision that deter-
mines liability, even though there is no "final judgment" in the tradi-
tional sense that damages have been measured and a collectible
judgment is entered for at least one claimant. Timely appeal may, and
indeed must, be taken from a final determination of liability, or the
determination passes beyond any appellate review. The determina-
tion of liability is crucial to all that follows. Immediate appeal may be
desirable even if all subsequent proceedings will be held in the mass
tort action court. Immediate appeal is important if there is any pros-
pect that some part of the remaining proceedings will be transferred
to other courts.
Dispersion of individual proceedings from the mass tort action
court creates thorny problems of appeal jurisdiction. There is a great
risk that appeals to many or all of the circuits, and within many or all
state-court systems, could undo most of the gains made in the mass
tort proceeding. The answer given here is that all appeals should go
to the federal court of appeals for the circuit of the mass tort action
21 See 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a) (3) (1994) (providing that if an agency, board, commis-
sion or officer receives two or more petitions for review of an order, it must notify the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, which randomly selects one court of appeals
from those in which a petition for review was filed and consolidates the petitions for
review in that court).
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court. This answer is not startling when the individual proceeding is
held in a federal district court outside the circuit of the mass tort ac-
tion. It is startling when the individual proceeding is held in a state
court. Appellate review through the ordinary state-court processes,
followed by certiorari review in the Supreme Court of the United
States, however, would not answer the needs of the situation. Review
of even a state trial court in any federal court but the Supreme Court
will prove unpopular, and will surely encounter constitutional chal-
lenges based on the Article III, Section 1 provision for "one Supreme
Court."2 The draft remains the first choice nonetheless. It is desir-
able both to make use of state court capacities to resolve individual
disputes and to ensure unified appellate review.
If the mass tort action court is a state court, there is no need to
brave the storms of protest as to appeals from the mass tort action
court. Appeals can be resolved in the state court system in the ordi-
nary course of state practice. It may be that some states provide in-
adequate opportunities for interlocutory review, but federal dictation
seems too much to bear. There is a problem, however, if the state
mass tort action court sends individualized proceedings to other
courts. The draft provides a logical solution: all appeals come back to
the state system of the mass tort action court. If the logic is apparent,
the constitutional challenges are even more apparent. Providing by
federal statute that the courts of one state can review the judgments of
courts in another state is outside most concepts of our federal struc-
ture. Even adoption of this scheme by interstate compact or recipro-
cal legislation would strain most concepts. And if the individual pro-
ceeding is held in a United States court, the prospect that the
judgment of an Article III court might be reviewed by a state court is
even more unthinkable. At this point the draft can stand only as an
illustration of the fully sensible elaboration of the scheme, not a plau-
sible candidate for enactment. Once the Judicial Panel on Multidis-
trict Litigation transfers an action to a state court, the federal courts
and the courts of other states must bow out. The result will be to de-
ter transfer to state courts.
Some formal substitute might yet save the day by facilitating state-
court participation on terms that provide common review without the
appearance of direct appeal. One form would provide for a limited
transfer: the state court accepts transfer for trial of specified issues
22 U.S. CONST. art. m, § 1 ("Thejudicial power of the United States, shall be vested
in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish.").
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and then remits the case to the mass tort action court. The mass tort
action court could then enter the formal judgment, subject to appeal
in its own system.23
(n) Judgment. The object of a mass tort action is to establish final
resolution of all claims. This section begins by declaring the binding
effect of the judgment on all persons made parties under subsection
(d). Because subsection (d) is all-embracing, so is the judgment.
The risk of final resolution, of course, is that it may be wrong.
The way of mass tort litigation to date suggests that there is little risk
that liability will be improperly denied. Nonetheless, the risk is there.
The scientific proof of causation that underlies some mass tort claims
has been sketchy, and an unusual combination of court and parties
may actually come to resolve a claim on the merits and against liabil-
ity. Later scientific evidence may fill the gap in earlier understanding.
The provision for vacating a judgment denying liability responds to
this possibility. This provision seems unduly favorable to tort victims,
but it should increase the court's courage to deny liability in the face
of weak evidence. It might seem that equal treatment requires a pro-
vision for vacating a judgment of liability when exculpatory informa-
tion later emerges. Shattering the repose of successful tort plaintiffs
may be fair, but it is not likely to win many supporters.
(o) Attorney Fees. The provision for attorney fees is included in
the statute to resolve any doubts whether a court rule can regulate at-
torney fee awards. The attorney-appointment process is governed by
draft Rule 23.3(d) (3). The provision that fees may be awarded against
the represented persons is most likely to be invoked if the mass tort
action judgment establishes liability but leaves determination of indi-
vidual awards to individual proceedings. The fee order could be lim-
ited to individual plaintiffs who actually recover damages. The further
provision that allows the court to set fees paid for individual represen-
tation addresses the possibility that an individual claimant, having vi-
cariously contributed to the award of class fees, might otherwise con-
front a substantial contingent fee charged for very little work and
essentially no risk.
A rough analogy might be found to the procedures that have been created to
support appeals within the federal system following postjudgment removal from a
state court. See 15AWRIGHT, MIi.ER & COOPER, supra note 18, § 3901 n.5.
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B. The Rule
Draft Rule 23.3 would be supported by the special enabling provi-
sions drafted as 28 U.S.C. § 1335A(e) .24
(a) Applicability. Rule 23.3 applies only to mass tort actions
brought under § 1335A. Reform of procedures not addressed in Rule
23.3 would be undertaken independently, if at all. No attempt is
made to adopt a comprehensive procedure for mass tort actions.
Most matters, such as pleading, motions, pretrial practice, and disclo-
sure and discovery, would remain within current Rules, which provide
sufficient flexibility to adapt to the needs of a mass tort action.
(b) Claimants. This provision-as later provisions-is drafted in
reliance on § 1335A. The reference to "the course of conduct giving
rise to a mass tort action" is the illustration for this subdivision. The
inclusion of future injuries in the definition of a "claimant" is one of
the points at which the special enabling provision in § 1335A(e) may
be useful. The challenges that must be encountered in dealing with
future claims are recounted in Professor Hazard's paper and need not
be revisited here.25
(c) Claimant Participation. A personal-injury plaintiff's interest in
disposition of an individual claim is likely to involve a substantial
amount of money, an amount of money that is important in relation
to the plaintiff's need for basic care and support, and an intensely
personal sense of aggrievement. It is desirable to ensure the opportu-
nity to participate as an individual party, going beyond the rather
vague provision for entering an appearance in Rule 23(c) (2) (0). At
the same time, meaningful participation by more than a small number
of individual claimants could destroy any attempt to achieve effective
disposition of common issues. As compared to the rather shadowy re-
ality of individual participation in most methods now used to resolve
mass torts, there is not much meaningful sacrifice in the provision
that allows the court to assert control "to serve the uniform, just, and
efficient disposition of all claims." The mandatory character of the
mass tort action is maintained by the provision that bars individual
claimants from requesting exclusion.
21 See supraPart I.
SeeGeoffrey C. Hazard,Jr., The Futures Problem, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1901 (2000).
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(d) Claimant Representation. The three paragraphs of this subdivi-
sion deal with distinctive questions.
The first paragraph addresses the need for multiple classes and
subclasses in open-ended terms. The goal is to assure representation
of all claimants "by a class representative who does not represent sig-
nificantly conflicting interests." This language is intended to support
a pragmatic assessment of potential conflicts, with an eye to holding
the number of classes down to a manageable level. Although refer-
ence is made to classes and subclasses, no attempt is made to draw
meaningful distinctions between creation of separate classes and divi-
sion of one class into subclasses. It might be better to refer only to
separate classes. The familiar conflicts between present and future
claimants support the prohibition against including both present and
future claimants in the same class. Transfer from a futures class to a
present class seems obvious enough, but practical implementation
may prove awkward. More work needs to be done on the process for
shifting members between classes.
Imposing responsibility on the court to assure designation of ca-
pable representatives is a first response to the common desire to pro-
vide a real "client" to superintend counsel. There is real force to the
objection that imposing this responsibility injects the court too far
into the adversary process, picking one of the parties. Yet self-
selection-which often amounts to selection by counsel-is still less
attractive.
Imposing responsibility on the court to designate counsel repre-
sents another incursion into the adversary process. It is justified, how-
ever, by the common concerns about the entrepreneurial process that
has privatized a procedure that has significant public elements. Some
relief from the race-to-file may be found in the provision that no at-
tention should be paid to the time at which counsel first sought to
represent a class. The sketchy criteria for selecting counsel do not af-
ford much protection against the risk that a small network of lawyers
will repeatedly take command of mass tort litigation. It would be un-
wise to forgo the great benefits of the experience of such lawyers with
mass tort litigation. A Committee Note, however, should warn against
the comfortable habit of relying only on familiar players. Taking ac-
count of arrangements for fees and expenses provides explicit author-
ity for "bidding" among prospective counsel, but does not attempt to
define the process in more particular terms.
(e) Notice. Notice is a sensitive part of any class-like action and is
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seldom fully satisfactory. The character of mass tort actions under-
scores the need for effective notice because of the importance of indi-
vidual claims, even apart from the challenge of notifying class mem-
bers who have not yet experienced an injury. These notice provisions
are a first attempt to address these problems.
The basic notice provision is no doubt a vain attempt to require
notice language that is likely to be comprehensible to most class
members. The contents of the notice seem unremarkable. The
"course of conduct giving rise to the action" corresponds to the defini-
tion of a mass tort action in § 1335A(a). Reference in the notice to
the stay and transfer provisions of § 1335A(f) facilitates implementa-
tion of those provisions when a copy of the notice is filed in another
court.
The burdens imposed by paragraph (2) on the person who initi-
ates the mass tort action are reduced by the fact that actions against
that person should be known. Filing the notice in those actions
should be easily accomplished. Notice by ordinary mail to all present
claimants who have not filed actions seems sufficient, although return-
receipt mall or commercial delivery deserve consideration. Imposing
the costs of this notice on the person who initiates the action seems a
reasonable price to exact for seeking global resolution. The brackets
indicate uncertainty whether enough good would be accomplished to
justify the cost and confusion of requiring notice from the person ini-
tiating the mass tort action to future claimants.
The provision for general notice to class members, including indi-
vidual notice to individuals who can be identified through reasonable
effort, is not a satisfying means of notice to future claimants. The
supplemental provisions for notice to a "central judicial authority in
each state," and for yearly notice in "suitable popular media," are an
attempt to do a bit more. It remains possible that the difficulty of sat-
isfactory notice may defeat the attempt to bind future claimants by the
proceeding. The best hope may lie not so much in more ingenious
ways to effect actual notice as in concepts akin to limitations doctrine.
So long as a future claimant is assured a reasonable opportunity to
bring suit after an injury arises, the provision for notice to state judi-
cial authorities and the interest of the defendant should serve to
channel the claims into an appropriate tribunal for resolution.
Allowing the court to allocate the costs of notice after the initial
paragraph (2) notice seems sensible. Protecting claimants and their
representatives against bearing the cost of notice also seems sensible,
but may not be inevitably right.
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(f) Settlement. The settlement provisions of draft Rule 23.3 track
the draft Rule 23(e) set out below, with only one modest variation and
two important differences. The variation is that Rule 23.3(f) (1) refers
only to settlement. The authority to dismiss or compromise is deleted
in an attempt to focus on positive settlement. Dismissal without
prejudice should remain available, but not as a matter of agreement
between the claimants' representatives and the defendants. The first
and more important difference is that Rule 23.3(f) does not allow a
claimant to opt out after the terms of settlement are announced. The
opt-out provision, certain to be controversial in the Rule 23 setting in
any event, would defeat the very purpose of global disposition through
Rule 23.3. The second difference is that the provision for discovery by
objectors does not extend to the merits of the underlying claims or
defenses. The omission of such discovery reflects the assumption that
a mass tort action will be created only after sufficient development of
the merits in other proceedings to satisfy all reasonable needs for in-
formation to support effective objections.
The purpose of the remaining settlement provisions is discussed
in the draft Committee Note appended to draft Rule 23 (e) below.
C. Alternatives
Many different models for comprehensivejoinder and global reso-
lution could be built. The variations, however, would play on the
same themes. Adoption of any scheme of such magnitude will be re-
sisted on two basic grounds. The first is that it is not desirable to seek
comprehensive resolution in a single proceeding, even if there were
no other costs attached to doing so. The second is that even if it is de-
sirable to achieve comprehensive resolution in a single proceeding,
the costs are too great. It is difficult to believe that these grounds of
resistance will be overcome. That leaves the way open to ask whether
substantial benefits would flow from adopting some aspects of the
comprehensive approach without going all the way. A few of the more
likely partial solutions may be sketched to illustrate the possibilities.
(a) Limit State-Court Class Actions. Congress has expressed interest
in limiting the scope of class actions in state courts. The approach
that has attracted most support is to establish federal subject-matter
jurisdiction on the basis of minimal diversity and to provide for re-
moval to federal court whenever any member of a plaintiff class is a
citizen of a state different from any defendant. There are provisions
to remand an "intrastate case" on showing both that the claims will be
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governed primarily by the laws of the state in which the action was
originally filed, and also showing that both a substantial majority of
plaintiff class members and the primary defendants are citizens of that
26state. That approach calls for judgments that may be difficult to ad-
minister, involving determinations about what law should apply and
who are the "primary" defendants. If it is feared that class actions and
class action settlements may be "shopped" too easily among the many
states, seeking an acquiescent forum, it might be better to legislate di-
rect limits on the breadth of state-court class actions. One approach
would be to deny the opportunity to entertain a nationwide class ac-
tion in state court. State actions could be limited to classes whose
members are citizens of the state or were injured in the state. It is
tempting to allow also classes whose members were injured by conduct
in the state, reflecting a conduct state's manifest regulatory interest.
This temptation might better be resisted. Often, it would be possible
to locate a sufficient conduct relationship to support a nationwide
class. It is at least conceivable, moreover, that some defendants might
deliberately move their conduct to hospitable states.
(b) Overlaping Classes. Overlapping and competing classes might
be constrained by recognizing the power to enjoin rival proceedings.
It would have to be decided whether to allow an injunction by the first
court that wants to seize control, or whether some order of preference
should be established. Preference to the court where the first action
is filed would invite races to file. Preference to the court first to certify
a class would invite a somewhat different kind of race. Preference to
federal courts might reduce the opportunities for racing, particularly
if it were coupled with flexible procedures for transfer or coordina-
tion of rival classes.
(c) Repetitive Class Requests. Forum shopping could be reduced
substantially by prohibiting any court from certifying a class that is
substantially similar to a class that has been rejected by another court.
An exception should be made if certification was denied because the
class claims were not "mature." Some means might be found to ad-
dress the danger that the first action was collusive, brought for the
See, e.g., H.R. 1875, 106th Cong. § 3(b)(2) (1999) (granting federal subject-
matter jurisdiction to class actions based on minimal diversity, but exempting "intra-
state cases [s]" in which the primary governing law will be that of the state in which the
action was originally filed and a "substantial majority" of the plaintiffs and "the primary
defendants" are from that state).
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very purpose of defeating certification. Perhaps it would suffice to
rely on the general principle that a class is not bound by inadequate
representation. The difficulties, however, suggest particular caution
in approaching this question.
(d) Settlement Shopping. It might be easier to craft a statute that
prohibits any court from approving a class settlement substantially
similar to a settlement that has been rejected by another court. Al-
though this approach would give broad power to the first court asked
to approve a settlement, it has great attraction, particularly if coupled
with an effective means for supporting objections to the settlement
when it is first proposed.
(e) Mandatory Class. It may be within reach of the rulemaking
process to adopt a no-opt-out class action rule for mass torts, either as
part of present Rule 23 or as a separate rule. There would be no need
to worry about identifying a "limited fund." If "futures" claimants
were included in the class, this approach could achieve a high level of
consolidation. Although it would be a strain to stretch the Enabling
Act to include a choice-of-law provision, it seems likely that creative
approaches would reduce the problems that arise from applying dif-
ferent bodies of law to different class members or to different defen-
dants.
(f) True Limited Fund. There is a special attraction to comprehen-
sive consolidation and unified disposition when there is a real pros-
pect that a defendant's assets are not sufficient to answer to reasona-
bly foreseeable tort claims. If we were not accustomed to the thought,
it would seem unthinkable that limited assets might be apportioned to
the first to file in the swiftest courts, without regard to others presently
injured or those whose injuries might not become apparent until
some future time. Whether or not the bankruptcy power is invoked,
the most obvious solution would be to legislate some version of the
settlements that have been worked out in these circumstances. Com-
plete ownership of the defendant is transferred to the claimants, with
a reversion to the original owners if indeed the assets prove adequate.
Again, the settlement device of a trust seems highly attractive. All
claims are redirected--"channeled--against the trust. The trust can
retain ownership of the defendant, or sell the defendant free from
that entire mass of tort liabilities. The trust, as owner of the liability,
also would become owner of all insurance and other rights of indem-
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nification or contribution.Y Disposition of individual claims could be
left to essentially administrative mechanisms, perhaps with presump-
tive schedules of benefits, priorities for payment based on severity of
injury or need, deferral of lesser injuries to ensure adequate compen-
sation for greater injuries, and so on.
(g) Federalized Choice of Law. A modest step could be taken by
adopting a federal choice-of-law statute, either for actions in federal
courts or for all actions. The object would be to reduce the number
of laws applied to a common course of conduct. If nothing else is
done, it would help to free federal courts from the obligation to at-
tempt to follow local state choice-of-law rules.
III. SETrLEMENTwrm ORWITHOUT SETrLEMENT CLASSES
A. Introduction
Settlement seems to hold out the best promise for resolving large
numbers of mass tort claims at one time, on consistent terms that
achieve some measure of similar treatment for similar injuries, and
with substantial savings in litigation costs. It seems safe to infer that
these gains are achieved on terms that mimic, behind a curtain, the
methods proposed for effective aggregated litigation. The charm of
settlement is that it tends to ignore choice-of-law issues-indeed the
settlement rests on an amalgam that is not the "law" of any place; dis-
regards many other differences that in legal theory also should vary
the awards for similar injuries similarly incurred; effectively prevents
further inter-court competition; and establishes peace within its self-
defining limits.
A different description of settlement's siren charms is that settle-
ment is blatantly alegal when compared to the results that actually
would be achieved by individual adjudication under the law. The at-
tempt to achieve effective individual adjudication is abandoned, even
when elaborate individual claims procedures are established to resolve
disputes within the narrowing framework of the settlement agree-
ment. Worse, bargaining in the impenetrable shadows cast by fifty or
Difficult questions may arise from "claims made" insurance policies that cover
only claims made during the policy period. Establishment of a claimants' trust might
be treated as an assertion of claims on behalf of all, but the relationship between fed-
eral law and state law, and the relationship between this procedural device and insur-
ance-contract law, lie beyond the scope of present speculation.
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more state laws applies no law at all. The settlement is more legislative
than judicial. The private legislation may be better, even far better,
than the official law that courts apply. But it binds class members by a
process that is no more official than the review provided by a court
that is informed primarily by parties who seek to win approval, not to
provide a full adversarial debate about the settlement.
Even if it be assumed that the adjudicating alternative to settle-
ment is at best a frail device, however, it will not do to embrace mass
settlement too warmly. Settlement is just that-a private agreement
that substitutes for adjudication. It provides none of the safeguards
that attend adjudication by a neutral judge. When the agreement is
made by the person who surrenders a claim with the person who sur-
renders the right to defend, we have substantial grounds to accept the
result even though it may be driven by fear of the costs and occasional
irrationalities of adjudication. When the agreement is made by a rep-
resentative of the person who owns the claim, however, we must be
more careful. If, as in much contemporary class action litigation, the
representative is a self-appointed champion who seeks to surrender
the claims of hundreds, thousands, or even hundreds of thousands of
victims whose claims are individually important, we must be extremely
careful.
The next Part presents draft Rule 23 provisions that confirm the
practice of certifying settlement classes and that expand the process
for reviewing proposed settlements. The draft would apply to all class
actions, not mass tort classes alone. The draft Committee Note pro-
vides much of the commentary, but the succeeding part supplies addi-
tional commentary.
2The Supreme Court has alluded to the tensions between the tradition that every
party should have an individual day in court and the theory of representation that sub-
stitutes for an individual day in court.
The inherent tension between representative suits and the day-in-court ideal is
only magnified if applied to damage claims gathered in a mandatory class....
And in settlement-only class actions the procedural protections built into the
Rule to protect the rights of absent class members during litigation are never
invoked in an adversarial setting.
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S.Ct. 2295, 2315 (1999) (citation omit-
ted).
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B. Class Action Settlement Draft
Rule 23 Settlement Class
(b) Glass Atizns Maintainsbl. When Class Actions May be Certified.
An action may be taintined certified as a class action for pur-
poses of settlement or trial if the prerequisites of subdivision (a)
are satisfied, and in addition * * *.
(e) Settlement, Dismissal, eo and Compromise.
(1) A class or subclass representative may, with the court's ap
proval, settle, dismiss, or compromise all or part of the class or
subclass claims, issues, or defenses.
(2) The court may not approve settlement, dismissal, or compro-
mise of all or part of Aan action certified as a class action sheR
net b.e dismissed et comprrAscd without a hearing, and no-
tice of the a proposed settlement, dismissals or compromise
s must be given to all members of the class in such manner
as the court directs.
(3) A settlement, dismissal. or compromise of a class action binds
a class member only if the class member was afforded an op
portunity to request exclusion from the class after notice of
the terms of the settlement, dismissal, or compromise, unless
the class member had an opportunity to request exclusion af-
ter notice of a proposed settlement, dismissal, or compromise
that was less favorable to the class member.
(4) Any class or subclass member may object to a proposed set-
tlement. An objector must be afforded discovery reasonably
calculated to appraise the apparent merits of the class claims.
issues, or defenses, and to disclose the course of settlement
negotiations and the terms of any incidental agreements or
understandings. The court must award as costs the actual rea-
sonable expenses (including attorney fees) incurred to sup
port a successful objection, and may award the actual reason-
able expenses (including attorney fees) incurred to support
an unsuccessful objection.
(5) In reviewing a proposed settlement, the court should con-
sider, among other factors:
(A) the maturity of the underlying substantive issues, as meas-
ured by experience in adjudicating individual actions, the
development of scientific knowledge, and other facts that
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bear on the ability to assess the probable outcome of a trial
on the merits of liability and individual damages:
(B) the extent of participation in the settlement negotiations
by class members or their unofficial representatives, a
judge, a magstrate judge, or a special master:
(C) the cost and probable outcome of a trial on the merits of
liability and individual damages:
(D) the total resources available to the parties agreeing to pay
money under the settlement
(E) the existence and probable outcome of claims by other
classes and subclasses:
(F) the comparison between the results achieved by the settle-
ment for individual class or subclass members and the re-
sults achieved-or likely to be achieved-for other claim-
ants*
r (G) whether class or subclass members are accorded the right
to opt out of the settlement1
(H) the reasonableness of any provisions for attorney fees, in-
cluding agreements with respect to the division of fees
among attorneys and the nature or absence of any agree-
ments affecting the fees to be charged for representing in-
dividual claimants or objectors:
(I) whether the procedure for processing individual claims un-
der the settlement is fair and reasonable: and
(J) the apparent intrinsic fairness of the settlement terms.
(6) A proposal to settle, dismiss, or compromise part or all of an
action certified as a class action may be referred to a magistrate
judge or a person specially appointed for an independent investi-
gation and report to the court on the fairness of the proposal.
The expenses of the investigation and report and the fees of a
person specially appointed will be paid by the parties as directed
by the court.
Committee Note
Subdivision (b) is amended to confirm the ruling in Amchem Prod-
ucts, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619 (1997), that it is proper to cer-
tify a class for settlement, even when the court might not certify the
same class-or any class-for trial. Settlement classes have become a
familiar and useful means of resolving some disputes. The common
use of settlement classes is reflected in T.E. Willging, L.L. Hooper,
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and R.J. Niemic, An Empirical Study of Class Actions in Four Federal Dis-
trict Courts: Final Report to the Advisoty Committee on Civil Rules (1996).
This amendment permits certification of a settlement class so long
as the subdivision (a) prerequisites are satisfied and certification is
proper under any paragraph of subdivision (b). The terms of pro-
posed Rule 23(e) protect the interests of class members in many ways,
including the right to request exclusion from the settlement. The
right to request exclusion from the settlement applies even if the class
is certified under subdivision (b) (1) or (b) (2).
Experience seems to show three rough settlement categories. The
simplest category occurs when a class is certified for all purposes and
then settles. This category is not as distinct as may seem, however,
since the parties may anticipate settlement at the time of certification.
A second category occurs when a class is certified for purposes of set-
tlement at a time when there is no settlement agreement. This cate-
gory blends by imperceptible degrees into the third, where-in its
pure form-the action is initially filed with a request for certification
after would-be class representatives have negotiated the terms of set-
tlement with the class adversary. Although there may be many shades
along the spectrum that ends in settlement, these three categories
identify a progression of concerns that surround class action settle-
ments.
Binding class members by settlement is least dangerous if a class is
certified for trial at a time when there is no understanding as to possi-
ble settlement. In this situation the class representatives have all the
bargaining power that derives from representation of the class and the
threat of enforcement through trial. The court has the greatest op-
portunity to become familiar with the merits of the litigation and thus
the best prospect of effective review of any proposed settlement. If it
seems desirable, the court also has the best opportunity to control the
designation of class representatives-including class counsel-and to
control the settlement process.
Certification only for settlement purposes weakens the court's po-
sition, and also weakens the position of class representatives. The
class adversary's incentive to settle is driven by the prospect of litiga-
tion in some other form, not by litigation against this class. This in-
centive may remain powerful, and indeed may be more powerful than
the incentive that derives from the threat of litigating with this class.
Settlement with a broad class may reduce the defendant's transaction
costs so far, and offer so substantial a reward in global peace, as to be
more valuable than any alternative mode of disposition. The court
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may have valuable reassurances of the quality of class representation
and the cogency of the settlement terms, moreover, if there has been
substantial precertification litigation, establishing the maturity of the
underlying dispute and ensuring the experience of class counsel. At
the other end of the spectrum, however, there is much less negotiat-
ing power if class members typically hold small claims that would not
support litigation by other means. There is substantial concern that
in these circumstances it may be possible for a class adversary to en-
gage in a "reverse auction" by threatening to negotiate a more favor-
able settlement with others willing to represent the same class in a dif-
ferent court. The court, moreover, may be completely dependent on
class representatives and their adversary for information about a pro-
posed settlement-and when all appear to argue in favor of the set-
tlement they have reached, there is little assurance that the court can
reach a satisfactory appraisal of the probable merits of the class posi-
tion, the costs of pursuing the position through litigation by any
means, and the value of the relief proposed.
The court may in some ways be in the weakest position when a set-
tlement is negotiated before class certification is requested. There is
little opportunity to influence the selection of class representatives or
counsel, and no litigation basis in this action to provide information
beyond that revealed in the process of seeking settlement approval.
Neither is there any opportunity to seek to structure the settlement
process. The prefiling cooperation among the parties may raise real
concerns whether a genuine case or controversy is presented. On the
other hand, the first notice of the class action will include the terms of
the settlement, affording maximum opportunity for class members to
appraise the proposed settlement and to request exclusion.
Subdivision (e) is amended to strengthen the process of reviewing
proposed class action settlements. It applies to all classes, whether
certified only for settlement or certified for all purposes.
Paragraph (1) expressly recognizes the power of a class represen-
tative to settle class claims, issues, or defenses. The reference to set-
tlement is added as a term more congenial to the modern eye than
"compromise."
Paragraph (2) confirms the common practice of holding hearings
as part of the process of approving dismissal or compromise of a class
action. The factors to be considered under paragraph (5) are com-
plex and should not be presented simply by stipulation of the parties.
A hearing should be held to explore a proposed settlement even if the
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proponents seek to waive the hearing and no objectors have ap-
peared.
Paragraph (3) recognizes the essential difference between disposi-
tion of a class member's rights by official adjudication and disposition
by private negotiation between court-confirmed representatives and a
class adversary. No matter how careful the inquiry into the settlement
terms, settlement does not carry the same reassurance ofjustice as an
adjudicated resolution. A class member is better protected by a right
to request exclusion after the terms of a proposed settlement are
known. But there is no need for a second opportunity to request ex-
clusion if there was a right to request exclusion after a proposed set-
tlement and a new settlement is reached on terms that are unambigu-
ously more favorable to class members. The right to opt out does not
mean much when there is little realistic alternative to class litigation,
although even then there may be an incentive to negotiate a settle-
ment that encourages class members to remain in the class. The pro-
tection is quite meaningful as to class members whose individual
claims will support litigation by individual action, or by aggregation
on some other basis, including another class action. The settlement
agreement can be negotiated on terms that allow any party to with-
draw from the agreement if a specified number of class members re-
quest exclusion. The negotiated right to withdraw protects the class
adversary against being bound to a settlement that does not deliver
the repose initially bargained for, and that may merely set the
threshold recovery that all subsequent settlement demands will seek to
exceed.
Paragraph (4) increases the support provided those who wish to
object to a proposed settlement. This support is important even
though there also is a right to request exclusion-class disposition
may be the most efficient means of resolving class members' claims,
and often may be the only means. Discovery as to the apparent merits
of the class position is particularly important if the settlement agree-
ment has been reached without substantial discovery in the class ac-
tion or in other litigation. The need for discovery as to the settlement
negotiations will be affected by such factors as the risks of conflicting
interests among class members or between counsel and class mem-
bers, the alternative protections built into the negotiation process by
the court, and the maturity of the claims. Discovery as to any "inci-
dental agreements or understandings" should extend to all arrange-
ments proximately related to the class settlement, including contem-
poraneous settlements of other claims, agreements with respect to
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representation of future clients, and understandings as to attorney
fees. The provisions for awarding expenses to objectors recognize the
vital importance of objections in the settlement review process. Our
judicial system is designed to depend on adversary presentation. Ef-
fective adversary exploration of a proposed settlement can be pro-
vided only by objectors. The reasonable expenses of making a suc-
cessful objection must be compensated. An objection may be counted
as successful for this purpose if it provokes changes in a proposed set-
tlement without the need for a court ruling. Even an unsuccessful ob-
jection can provide valuable reassurance about the quality of the set-
tlement for the court, class members, and the general public. The
discretion to award compensation for unsuccessful objections should
be exercised freely when these values have been secured.
Paragraph (5) sets out an incomplete list of factors that should be
considered in determining whether to approve a proposed settlement.
See In re: Prudential Ins. Co. of America Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions,
148 F.3d 283, 316-24 (3d Cir. 1998). Many of these factors reflect
practices that are not fully described in Rule 23 itself but that may
bear on the probable fairness of the settlement.
The maturity of the underlying substantive issues, described in
subparagraph (A), is more important in some cases than in others.
The concern with maturity is greatest with respect to mass torts that
inflict serious personal injury or extensive property damage in events
that are dispersed in time and place. Individual litigation is possible,
and often is pursued. Settlements in these circumstances should be
attempted only after it is clear that additional litigation is not likely to
improve significantly the information available to inform decision.
Many class actions, on the other hand, grow out of unique and closed
events, and often present issues that cannot realistically be litigated
outside the class action context. In these circumstances, there may be
little reason to hope for improved understanding through independ-
ent litigation.
Negotiation of a class action settlement entirely among class law-
yers and their adversaries may generate understandable concerns
about the fairness and effectiveness of the settlement terms. Subpara-
graph (B) does not require that others participate in the negotiations,
in part because attempts to control the negotiation process by rule
may often do more harm than good. But subparagraph (B) does en-
courage efforts to engage class members, unofficial representatives of
class members, or judicial personnel. If ajudge or other judicial offi-
cer is involved, review of the settlement must be provided by a differ-
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entjudge. Although not described in subparagraph (B), participation
by a class guardian, class steering committee, or other independent
class representative also should be viewed favorably.
The cost and probable outcome of trial, including damages, are
the most important measures of settlement fairness. Unfortunately,
often they are the most unmanageable. Predictions of cost will be
made by those with a motive to bolster the settlement, and predictions
of staggering costs will draw force from comparison to the vast sums
that have been spent on complex actions. Attempts by a court to sec-
ond-guess expenditure predictions, or to control actual expenditures,
may intrude deep into the adversary process. With respect to single-
event transactions that have not been litigated in separate actions, the
only secure basis for predicting the outcome might be an actual trial.
Subparagraph (C) serves as a reminder of these central factors, but
without attempting to detail the ways in which they may prove elusive.
Settlement is a pragmatic process that must take account of a de-
fendant's ability to pay. If a settling party asserts that its ability to an-
swer claims is constrained by its resources in relation to these and
other claims against it, a showing should be made as to its assets and
claims. Discovery on these issues will be an important part of the re-
view process.
A settlement on behalf of a class that does not include all poten-
tial claimants is properly affected by the existence and probable out-
come of claims by other classes or subclasses. This subparagraph (E)
factor, and the corresponding subparagraph (F) factor, seem to invite
speculation as to the comparative merits of other class claims. Some
exploration of these comparisons may be appropriate, but the court
must guard against the risk of litigating claims not before it. The
claims of non-class members present other difficult questions when a
defendant may lack resources sufficient to pay all claims. The defen-
dant's ability actually to perform the settlement may be affected by the
unresolved claims. And actual performance of a present settlement
may impair the ability of others to win comparably effective relief. Re-
sponse to these problems may be complicated. Concern for other
claimants cannot readily be implemented by disapproving a settle-
ment as too generous to the class before the court, but might warrant
an effort to bring the other claimants into the proceedings. One ap-
proach might be to expand the class definition and then establish
subclasses to represent groups with conflicting interests. Concern for
class members may require modification of settlement terms to estab-
lish adequate assurances of performance.
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Both in negotiating settlements and in appraising a particular set-
tlement, people naturally consider the actual or probable disposition
of similar claims. Subparagraph (F) recognizes the importance of this
factor.
[Subparagraph (G) is inserted in the expectation that the para-
graph (3) right to opt out will prove controversial. If there is always a
right to opt out of the class after notice of settlement terms, subpara-
graph (G) will be deleted. If paragraph (3) is deleted, the Note ob-
servations will be modified to suit subparagraph (G).]
The reasonableness of attorney fees provided by settlement is im-
portant to the public perception of fairness. Excessive fees also raise
the image of conflicting interests, in which attorneys have bargained
away possible class relief in favor of their own fees. Application of
subparagraph (H) should be affected by the negotiation process and
the source of fees. There are structural reassurances of reasonable-
ness if fees are negotiated separately after conclusion of the class-relief
portion of the settlement, and if the fees are to be paid by the class
adversary rather than out of class relief.
Settlements often establish procedures for processing individual
claims. Proofs of claim often are required and may be indispensable,
and there may be systems for resolving disputed facts. Other proce-
dures may be very useful in providing low-cost and accurate resolution
of individual entitlements under the settlement. Subparagraph (I)
underscores the importance of ensuring that these procedures are fair
and reasonable.
All of the factors enumerated in paragraph (5), and others that
might be named, bear on fairness. Fairness often is measured by a
process that is not readily articulated. Subparagraph (J) recognizes
the legitimacy of considering apparent intrinsic fairness on a partly
gestalt basis that draws from accumulated judicial wisdom and experi-
ence.
Paragraph (6) establishes an opportunity to acquire independent
information about the wisdom of a proposed class action settlement.
The parties who support the settlement cannot always be relied upon
to provide adequate information about the reasons for rejecting the
settlement. Information may be provided through objections by class
members, and paragraph (4) is designed to enhance the objection
process. But objectors often find it difficult to acquire sufficient in-
formation, and the burdens of framing comprehensive and persuasive
objections may be insurmountable. A magistrate judge or person spe-
cially appointed by the court to make an independent investigation
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and report may be better able to acquire the necessary information
and, with expenses paid by the parties, better able to bear the burdens
of acquiring and using the information. The opportunity provided by
this paragraph should, however, be exercised with restraint. In most
cases it is better that the trial judge assume responsibility for directing
the parties to provide sufficient information to evaluate a proposed
settlement. Direction by the judge will ensure that the judge receives
the needed information and bears the primary responsibility for
evaluating the settlement in light of this information.
The choice whether to appoint a magistrate judge to conduct the
paragraph 6 investigation will depend on a variety of factors. The
costs to the parties are reduced because there is no need to pay fees
for the magistrate judge's time. A magistrate judge provides the reas-
surances of expertness and impartiality that attach to public office.
Appointment of a private person to undertake the inquiry may be de-
sirable, however, if the inquiry is to extend beyond the traditional ju-
dicial role of receiving information provided by the parties. It may
seem out of role for a magistrate judge to undertake or direct an ac-
tive investigation of the sort traditionally left to adversary parties. If
the judge contemplates an investigation of the sort that might be
taken by a well-supported but impartial objector, it may be better to
appoint a private person.
An appointment under paragraph (6), whether of a magistrate
judge or a private person, is not made under Rule 53 and is not sub-
ject to its constraints.
C. Settlement Questions
The range of questions that might be addressed to the model set
out above includes questions both about what it does and about what
it does not do. One of the most important questions is whether a class
action settlement presents a justiciable case or controversy, particu-
larly if the class is certified only for settlement. That question may be
affected by the narrower questions, and is discussed last.
(a) Structural Safeguards. Settlement models commonly seek to
enhance fairness by a variety of means. The model set out above relies
on the right to opt out, increased support for objectors, a long check-
list of factors to inform the fairness review, and the opportunity for
independent inquiry by a court-appointed officer. Although there will
be disagreement about the details, all of these strategies are familiar.
All of them together may not provide as much reassurance as there
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should be. If it were possible, it would be desirable to provide some
structural substitute for negotiations that involve only some number of
representatives for the class and the party opposing the class. Design-
ing such a structure, however, may prove impossible.
One step would be to require certification that there has been no
tentative negotiation before filing the action. This requirement would
strengthen any other structural protection that might be devised. The
result would be to defeat the practice of agreeing on a settlement be-
fore filing the action, but this defeat is the very purpose of providing
structures to guide or control the negotiations.
Another step might require that the court appoint some or all of
the class representatives, both class members and counsel. A variation
would call for appointment of a steering committee of class members
to advise and review settlement proposals. Another would call for a
professional "guardian" to review the work of class counsel, free from
any interest in the fees that will flow from successful settlement. Crea-
tion of multiple subclasses to reduce conflicts of interest among those
who might be classed together is commonly suggested. But all of
these approaches come at a cost. The Supreme Court has recognized
that "at some point there must be an end to reclassification with sepa-
rate counsel."2 Proliferation of the numbers who must join may frus-
trate the prospect of any agreement and accentuate potential differ-
ences of individual advantage that might better be bargained away in
an averaging settlement. Unless subclasses are made very small,
moreover, they may generate the worst of all worlds: class representa-
tives continue to struggle with all the temptations that confront any
class representative, and the occasions for explicit strategic trading are
multiplied. A guardian may have no better sense of fairness than the
original negotiators, whether the guardian participates in the original
negotiations or undertakes a subsequent review. Expansion of the
number of class representatives who participate may provide a better
proxy "client" for the lawyers than a faceless class, but the risk of
numbers persists.
Interjecting the court into the settlement process itself might pro-
vide greater protections. If this approach is taken, the judge who per-
forms the ultimate fairness review must have no connection to the ju-
2 Otiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2320. This statement was followed by the observation that a
settlement that treats equally claimants who are differently situated "is itself an alloca-
tion decision with results almost certainly different from the results that those with
immediate injuries or claims of indemnified liability would have chosen." Id at 2320.
It is difficult to integrate these two observations.
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dicial officials who participated in settlement negotiations. Even with
that safeguard, it ill becomes the judicial office to broker a settlement.
The judge-negotiator may be less well informed than the judge who
reviews a final settlement; the efforts of the parties to persuade each
other as well as the judge may confuse more than clarify. Suggestions
by ajudge frequently create the risk of undue impact, and suggestions
by an ill-informedjudge may be all the more risky. It is intriguing to
speculate about structural safeguards, but this does not yet seem a
promising path.
(b) Opt-out The opportunity to request exclusion from a class
settlement is likely to provide effective protection for many class
members when the class deals with substantial individual claims for
personal injury. Unlike most "small claims" classes, many class mem-
bers will have professional advice, so that a decision not to request ex-
clusion represents understanding consent to be bound. Understand-
ing consent helps to resolve any lingering doubts whether the
settlement conflicts with the Seventh Amendment jury-trial right!'0
The protection is not perfect; some class members may not have pro-
fessional advice, and the advice may not always be good. There is no
protection at all for many latent-injury claimants, unless the opportu-
nity to opt out continues for a reasonable period after the injury be-
comes known.
A contrasting problem is that the opt-out protection may be too
effective. The protection may easily be too effective if the objective is
to secure massive disposition all at once. It also may be too effective if
measured by the desire to achieve fair and consistent treatment of
many claimants. One threat to fair and consistent treatment may arise
from conflicting interests that lead an attorney to recommend exclu-
sion that benefits the attorney more than the client. A different threat
may arise from wise advice based on the perception that the class
member who opts out may achieve a particularly powerful strategic or
"nuisance" value, so long as not too many opt out. Settlement of a
reasonably small number of opt-out claims may be far more attractive
to the defendant than trying them, not because these claims are nec-
essarily the strongest claims but because of the costs of defense. The
terms of the class settlement are likely to be treated as the bargaining
floor. But denying the right to opt out would defeat the most effective
The Seventh Amendment concerns expressed by the Supreme Court were ar-
ticulated in terms of "a mandatory settlement-only class action." Id. at 2314.
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means of assuring the reasonable fairness of an aggregated settlement.
A compromise might be found in a rule that prohibits the defendant
from settling with an opted-out class member on terms that are more
favorable than the class settlement. Opt-outs also might be denied the
right to join in any alternative class; denial of any other form of ag-
gregation also might be considered, although that remedy may be too
costly for all concerned. The right to opt out would be preserved, but
would be attractive only for class members willing to go to trial. The
strategic hold-out value would be diminished substantially. We may
not be prepared to accept a measure of this sort, but it deserves con-
sideration.
(c) Attorney Fees. Negotiating the settlement of a mass tort on an
aggregated basis, whether by class action or some other means, is an
expensive business. It is likely to be expensive even if counsel for the
victims have litigated many individual cases and need no further in-
formation about the liability issues. It will be still more expensive if
more work remains to be done on liability. The investment in nego-
tiation and in any added work on the merits is lost if there is no set-
tlement and no class judgment. The risk is aggravated if liability re-
mains uncertain, if there is an opportunity to opt out and so many
members seize the opportunity that the settlement is defeated, if there
are competing classes that may offer more attractive settlement terms,
and so on. Counsel negotiating for the plaintiffs have a powerful in-
terest in reaching an agreement and winning compensation for both
expenses and attorney fees.
This interest in achieving settlement suggests an imperfect anal-
ogy to the rulings in Tumey v. Ohio.3' The Ohio Prohibition Act was
deliberately designed to create an incentive for a small village to
prosecute liquor violations in other parts of its county because the leg-
islature feared that some local governments would not prosecute vio-
lations. The 1140-person Village of North College Hill embarked on
an entrepreneurial campaign to find, prosecute, and convict liquor
violators. The state law rewarded the village with one-half of the fines
collected. The village mayor, presiding in the village court, recovered
costs of twelve dollars upon each conviction, and nothing for acquit-
tal. The mayor earned an average of about one hundred dollars a
month in costs from convictions, and the village in a period of seven
and one-half months earned nearly nine thousand dollars as its share
' 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
2000] AGGREGATION AND SE7TrLEMENT OFMASS TORTS
of the fines. The Supreme Court found two due process violations in
this system. The mayor, as judge, had more than a de minimis interest
in the costs he would receive if, but only if, he convicted a defendant:
Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average
man as ajudge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the de-
fendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear
and true between the State and the accused, denies the latter due proc-
ess of law. 2
Due process also was denied because the village's interest in the
fines could affect the mayor's judgment. The mayor, in addition to
his individual interest, had an "official motive to convict and to gradu-
ate the fine to help the financial needs of the village.,*s
A class lawyer negotiating a settlement is not a judge. The settle-
ment will take effect only following review by a judge for fairness. It
may fairly be urged that the principles of Tumney v. Ohio are inapposite
accordingly. This argument, however, relies on the strength of the re-
view for fairness. In reality, the settlement negotiations involve innu-
merable tradeoffs that can reasonably be resolved in innumerable
ways. There is not one single reasonable settlement, but a universe of
reasonable possible settlements. An enormous responsibility is borne
by the lawyers for all parties, but particularly by the lawyers for the
class. It is fair to ask whether due process can be reconciled with the
intense interest that class lawyers have in reaching some settlement.
The question can be raised, and is raised, without impugning in any
way the honor of class lawyers. As the Court observed in the Tumey
case: "[T ] he requirement of due process of law in judicial procedure
is not satisfied by the argument that men of the highest honor and the
greatest self-sacrifice could carry it on without danger of injustice.
'
So it is with class action settlements, particularly in mass torts, and
most particularly in settlement classes. There is an entrepreneurial
element in setting out to enforce the law on behalf of the class,just as
there was an entrepreneurial element in the liquor law enforcement
plan of the Village of North College Hill. Perhaps too much respon-
sibility rests with the lawyers who, de facto, approach too close to the
power of actual disposition.
The very distance between settlement and adjudication may sug-
gest one line of response to the question raised by the Tumey princi-
32 Id. at 532.
Id. at 535.
Id. at 532. The passage continues with the text cited at note 32 supra
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ple. A mass tort settlement inevitably involves choices within a heavily
populated universe of reasonable alternatives. It was suggested above
that the process is as much legislative as judicial. Perhaps it is better
to see the negotiators as legislators, or even a de facto regulatory
agency, and to develop standards of interest uniquely tailored to the
needs of the situation.
If the Tumey question may be raised for class actions, where judi-
cial approval is required, it may be raised also for other modes of ag-
gregated disposition. It can be argued, for example, that the realistic
alternatives to settlement by class action or by some new but compara-
ble device present even greater dangers. A single firm that settles an
inventory of hundreds or thousands of claims, dealing with the same
defendants over a relatively brief period of time, has enormous power
to allocate the settlements no matter how careful the effort to pre-
serve the forms of individual settlement. The risks of vicarious settle-
ment may be unavoidable. For want of sufficientjudicial resources to
adjudicate all claims, perhaps we must swallow any due-process doubts
and persist with a system that at least disposes of claims.
(d) Shared Settlement Interest. The district court in the Amchem liti-
gation found that asbestos victims share an interest in avoiding the
costs, delays, and risks of piecemeal tort litigation that transmutes into
a common interest in achieving a fair settlement.s The Supreme
Court found this interest inadequate under Rule 23, holding that this
common interest in the fairness of the proposed settlement does not
satisfy the commonality and predominance tests that must apply to
"the legal or factual questions that qualify each class member's case as
a genuine controversy, questions that preexist any settlement.
" 36
Focusing on the virtues of settlement and not its dangers, the in-
terest identified by the district court is real and important. There is a
powerful shared interest in achieving all of the things that can be
achieved only by settlement. Indeed, as detailed above, the greatest
charm of settlement is that it enables a disposition that cuts free from
the shortcomings of substantive law as well as the fallibility of our pro-
cedural institutions. Neither individual litigation nor disposition of an
aggregated litigation by adjudication can do as well. From this per-
spective, we would do well to focus on crafting the best settlement
S See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 316 (E.D. Pa. 1994) ("The
members of the class... all share an interest in receiving prompt and fair compensa-
tion for their claims .... ").
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 607, 623 (1997).
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procedure possible, and to put aside lingering doubts about the im-
portance of individual opportunities to opt out, the enormous com-
plexities that charge the professional responsibility of class counsel
with almost unendurable pressures, as well as other doubts.
Many approaches might be taken to recognize in Rule 23 the
shared interest in settlement. A simple beginning could be made in
Rule 23(b) (3) by adding these words: "the court finds that questions
of law or fact, or interests in settlement, common to the members of
the class predominate * * *;" and "The matters pertinent to the find-
ings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually
controlling the prosecution, or defense, or settlement of separate ac-
tions * * *."
(e) Justiciability. One last set of doubts about class settlement re-
mains to be addressed here. Is a settlement class, or anything that ap-
proximates a settlement class, a justiciable case or controversy within
the Article III competence of a federal court?
The temptation to translate judgments of policy into constitu-
tional terms besets debates about aggregation of mass torts just as it
enters many other debates. Several observations may pave the way for
a concluding suggestion that there may, after all, be sound reason to
grapple with broad questions ofjusticiability. All of these questions tie
to the problems of mass settlement, but few of them are limited to the
settlement context.
One very pointed question arises from the cooperation shown
when representatives of a would-be class negotiate a settlement with
the defendant before the action is filed. Simultaneous presentation of
a complaint, answer, settlement, order for class certification and no-
tice, and tentative approval of the settlement may seem collusion, not
cooperation. The appearance should not control the result. Settle-
ment moots an action in the sense that no dispute remains for the
court to resolve, 7 but Article III does permit entry of a consent judg-
ment. The process of negotiation, under threat of continuing indi-
vidual actions, multiple aggregated actions, or an all-embracing class
action, can be vigorously adversarial. The challenge is to determine
whether we can create an aggregated adversary representation system
that fairly represents those who do not participate directly in manag-
S7 See ISA WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 18, § 3533.2 (explaining various
ways by which settlement renders disputes moot).
93 See id. § 3530 ("WJudgment may be entered.., on consent of the parties."
(footnote omitted)).
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ing the collective process. If a fair procedure can be devised, there is
a case or controversy.
One modest variation arises when, as in the model of sweeping
aggregation explored in Part II, a person against whom claims are as-
serted is allowed to take the initiative in seeking aggregation. The at-
tempt of one asbestos defendant to turn plaintiff by suing a defendant
class of claimants with the object of seeking settlement was rejected
for want of an Article III case or controversy, in part because there was
no allegation that the claimants had legally harmed the plaintiff by re-
fusing to settle.39 There may be real objections to a procedure that al-
lows a defendant to select the forum and time for litigation and possi-
bly its representative adversaries. Yet there is a real controversy with
any claimant that has made a claim, and the principle that allows de-
claratory relief in other settings suggests that there also is a real con-
troversy if we choose to extend declaratory remedies this far.
A second line ofjusticiability theory addresses the nominate cate-
gories of justiciability, particularly standing and ripeness. The Su-
preme Court put aside questions of ripeness and standing in the
Amchem decision, and questions framed as standing and "feigned ac-
tion" in the Ortiz decision.40 The feigned action label refers to the
need for true adversaries; this topic was addressed above. The doc-
trines of standing and ripeness have developed primarily as means of
rationing access to adjudication of public issues in actions brought to
challenge government action. The reasons that limit the role of
courts in resolving disputes between individuals and their govern-
ment, or in resolving disputes among different parts of the govern-
ment, have little to do with the questions that must be faced in reck-
oning with mass tort aggregation. There is a superficial resemblance
to the "third-party standing" theories that determine whether a party
properly before the court can seek to prevail by invoking "rights" that
somehow attach to someone else but not to the party. These theories,
however, are avowedly matters of prudence, not Article III. More to
the present point, these theories do not seek to address the question
whether one person should be accorded representative standing to
advance for adjudication and actual disposition the claims of others.!
3' See In reJoint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 14 F.3d 726, 731 (2d Cir. 1993) ("Ex-
cept when a party seeks declaratory relief, the plaintiff must assert that some conduct
on the part of the defendants has caused... actual or threatened injury to the plaintiff
that will be remedied or avoided by a determination of liability.").
40 See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2307; Amchen, 591 U.S. at 612.
" Third-party standing doctrine, also referred to at times as "jus tertii," is discussed
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The concern that underlies the ripeness challenge often involves
the peculiar problem of "futures" claimants. This problem most
commonly focuses on people who have been exposed to a product or
conditions in circumstances that may lead to active injury in the fu-
ture, but that have not yet produced any measurable injury. Such
claims are usually controlled by state law, which often affords no pres-
ent remedy for merely latent injury. There is a cogent argument that
it violates the principles of federalism established by the Erie decision
to undertake federal adjudication of claims that would not be recog-
nized by the state whose law controls. That argument, however, is not
an Article III ripeness argument. There are many issues susceptible to
present litigation and decision, and there may be compelling reasons
to establish a system that will fairly regulate relationships between pre-
sent claimants and future claimants. For example, if a wrongdoer is
insolvent, or threatened with insolvency by the tort claims, Article III
concerns surely would not prevent comprehensive disposition in
bankruptcy proceedings. To the contrary, it is far better to provide
present protection than to leave the future claimants to an uncertain
future fate. Even absent the pressures generated by insolvency, ripe-
ness analysis does not provide useful added insight.
There remains the vague, innominate general concept of justi-
ciability. This concept can be used to address the proper role of
courts in general terms. Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion,
provided one of the enduring descriptions, saying that justiciability
and its various categories
mean that a court will not decide a question unless the nature of the ac-
tion challenged, the kind of injury inflicted, and the relationship be-
tween the parties are such that judicial determination is consonant with
what was, generally speaking, the business of the Colonial courts and the
courts of Westminster when the Constitution was framed. The jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts can be invoked only under circumstances
which to the expert feel of lawyers constitute a "case or controversy."4
Only a few years ago, the "expert feel of lawyers" would have been
that "the relationship between the parties" does not establish a case or
controversy when lawyers purporting to represent vast numbers of po-
tential class members who have never heard of them sit down with a
at some length in 13 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 18, § 3531.9.
4 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (requiring federal courts in
which state claims are tried by virtue of diversity jurisdiction to apply state law as for-
mulated by the state's highest court).
43Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 (1951) (Frank-
furter,J., concurring).
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potential defendant to work out a deal to be presented to the court as
a complete package when an action is first filed. Only the felt pres-
sure of mass litigation, and of asbestos litigation in particular, has led
to serious consideration of such stratagems. It is not too late to con-
sider the question further. The question, moreover, extends beyond
the prepackaged settlement. It can fairly be addressed to any settle-
ment in which a court is asked to enter a final determination of rights
held by persons who have not directly participated in forming or
agreeing to the settlement.
The answer to the justiciability question may well depend on the
circumstances of particular cases. Settlement of a class action brought
on behalf of claimants whose claims generally would not bear the costs
of individual litigation may prove acceptable. Many class members, at
least, will have genuine adversary claims in the sense that they are
pleased to be told that they have suffered a wrong and are entitled to
a remedy. There is at least the potential for genuine adversary con-
flict between the class representatives and the defendant. The alter-
native to class action disposition may be no disposition.
Acceptance of the proposition that judicial adoption of a small-
claims class settlement is justiciable as proper judicial business does
not force acceptance of the same conclusion when the class includes
claimants whose claims realistically could be-and perhaps are-the
subject of individual litigation. Many mass tort claimants have such
claims. There is a realistic prospect that these claimants can play a
meaningful role in determining whether to settle their claims. Why,
then, allow a few claimants to appear on behalf of all, not to secure an
official determination of the claims but to ask that the class action
court and all other courts be foreclosed from making any official de-
termination? How does it become the business of the courts to trans-
fer the right to consent from the claims-holders to someone else?
Why should we not at least require actual consent in the form of an
affirmative choice to opt in to the settlement by each individual
claimant?
In shorter terms, the question asks for development of a theory of
representation that accounts for settlement as well as for adjudication.
Apart from expressing the conclusion that representation is proper-
as supported by the fact that we are doing it-it is difficult to find a
clearly articulated theory to explain and justify the conclusion.
The answer may lie in the perceived advantages of settlement.
Settlement is better than litigation, for reasons arising from the lim-
ited capacity of judicial institutions, from the frailties ofjudicial pro-
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cedure, and from the eccentricities of diverse bodies of tort law. The
settlement process is proper judicial business because it is better than
other courses of judicial business. This answer may be supplemented
by suggesting that aggregate litigation is better than individual litiga-
tion, but that we cannot possibly manage a form of aggregation that
can be resolved only by adjudication, not by settlement. Nevertheless,
justiciability expressions, alas, achieve no more in the end than pro-
viding another way of asking the questions that still have no clear
theoretical framework.
IV. CONCLUSION
These comments are intended to justify the failure to offer any
conclusion. The questions remain vexing because the needs are so
great and our institutional limitations give good cause to reject all an-
swers. Often the lack of persuasive theory should not stand in the way
of pragmatic adjustments that seem to work in practice. With mass
torts, however, it is difficult to measure what works in practice. Broad
inquiry is needed, but may be frustrated at the outset by the lack of
any feasible means to address the fundamental underlying questions
raised by substantive state tort law. The answers that may be framed
by federal legislation and rulemaking are particularly circumscribed
by this limit, unless there is a will to preempt state tort law. Preemp-
tion only for purposes of "mass torts" will require an extraordinarily
difficult definition that resolves the point at which numerous injuries
are transported from the realms of state laws into the preemptive
realm of federal mass tort law. Preemption for all purposes might
seem plausible for products liability and some environmental con-
tamination cases, but is not at all plausible for all the law of uninten-
tional injury. We are left in a muddle. Yet it remains useful to at-
tempt, as here, to summarize the constraints that will keep us
muddled for years to come.
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